openssl/crypto/dsa/dsa_ameth.c

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/*
* Copyright 2006-2021 The OpenSSL Project Authors. All Rights Reserved.
*
* Licensed under the Apache License 2.0 (the "License"). You may not use
* this file except in compliance with the License. You can obtain a copy
* in the file LICENSE in the source distribution or at
* https://www.openssl.org/source/license.html
*/
/*
* DSA low level APIs are deprecated for public use, but still ok for
* internal use.
*/
#include "internal/deprecated.h"
#include <stdio.h>
#include <openssl/x509.h>
#include <openssl/asn1.h>
#include <openssl/bn.h>
#include <openssl/core_names.h>
#include <openssl/param_build.h>
#include "internal/cryptlib.h"
#include "crypto/asn1.h"
#include "crypto/dsa.h"
#include "crypto/evp.h"
#include "internal/ffc.h"
#include "dsa_local.h"
static int dsa_pub_decode(EVP_PKEY *pkey, const X509_PUBKEY *pubkey)
{
const unsigned char *p, *pm;
int pklen, pmlen;
int ptype;
const void *pval;
const ASN1_STRING *pstr;
X509_ALGOR *palg;
ASN1_INTEGER *public_key = NULL;
DSA *dsa = NULL;
if (!X509_PUBKEY_get0_param(NULL, &p, &pklen, &palg, pubkey))
return 0;
X509_ALGOR_get0(NULL, &ptype, &pval, palg);
if (ptype == V_ASN1_SEQUENCE) {
pstr = pval;
pm = pstr->data;
pmlen = pstr->length;
if ((dsa = d2i_DSAparams(NULL, &pm, pmlen)) == NULL) {
ERR_raise(ERR_LIB_DSA, DSA_R_DECODE_ERROR);
goto err;
}
} else if ((ptype == V_ASN1_NULL) || (ptype == V_ASN1_UNDEF)) {
if ((dsa = DSA_new()) == NULL) {
ERR_raise(ERR_LIB_DSA, ERR_R_MALLOC_FAILURE);
goto err;
}
} else {
ERR_raise(ERR_LIB_DSA, DSA_R_PARAMETER_ENCODING_ERROR);
goto err;
}
if ((public_key = d2i_ASN1_INTEGER(NULL, &p, pklen)) == NULL) {
ERR_raise(ERR_LIB_DSA, DSA_R_DECODE_ERROR);
goto err;
}
if ((dsa->pub_key = ASN1_INTEGER_to_BN(public_key, NULL)) == NULL) {
ERR_raise(ERR_LIB_DSA, DSA_R_BN_DECODE_ERROR);
goto err;
}
dsa->dirty_cnt++;
ASN1_INTEGER_free(public_key);
EVP_PKEY_assign_DSA(pkey, dsa);
return 1;
err:
ASN1_INTEGER_free(public_key);
DSA_free(dsa);
return 0;
}
static int dsa_pub_encode(X509_PUBKEY *pk, const EVP_PKEY *pkey)
{
DSA *dsa;
int ptype;
unsigned char *penc = NULL;
int penclen;
ASN1_STRING *str = NULL;
ASN1_INTEGER *pubint = NULL;
ASN1_OBJECT *aobj;
dsa = pkey->pkey.dsa;
if (pkey->save_parameters
&& dsa->params.p != NULL
&& dsa->params.q != NULL
&& dsa->params.g != NULL) {
str = ASN1_STRING_new();
if (str == NULL) {
ERR_raise(ERR_LIB_DSA, ERR_R_MALLOC_FAILURE);
goto err;
}
str->length = i2d_DSAparams(dsa, &str->data);
if (str->length <= 0) {
ERR_raise(ERR_LIB_DSA, ERR_R_MALLOC_FAILURE);
goto err;
}
ptype = V_ASN1_SEQUENCE;
} else
ptype = V_ASN1_UNDEF;
pubint = BN_to_ASN1_INTEGER(dsa->pub_key, NULL);
if (pubint == NULL) {
ERR_raise(ERR_LIB_DSA, ERR_R_MALLOC_FAILURE);
goto err;
}
penclen = i2d_ASN1_INTEGER(pubint, &penc);
ASN1_INTEGER_free(pubint);
if (penclen <= 0) {
ERR_raise(ERR_LIB_DSA, ERR_R_MALLOC_FAILURE);
goto err;
}
aobj = OBJ_nid2obj(EVP_PKEY_DSA);
if (aobj == NULL)
goto err;
if (X509_PUBKEY_set0_param(pk, aobj, ptype, str, penc, penclen))
return 1;
err:
OPENSSL_free(penc);
ASN1_STRING_free(str);
return 0;
}
/*
* In PKCS#8 DSA: you just get a private key integer and parameters in the
* AlgorithmIdentifier the pubkey must be recalculated.
*/
static int dsa_priv_decode(EVP_PKEY *pkey, const PKCS8_PRIV_KEY_INFO *p8)
{
int ret = 0;
DSA *dsa = ossl_dsa_key_from_pkcs8(p8, NULL, NULL);
if (dsa != NULL) {
ret = 1;
EVP_PKEY_assign_DSA(pkey, dsa);
}
return ret;
}
static int dsa_priv_encode(PKCS8_PRIV_KEY_INFO *p8, const EVP_PKEY *pkey)
{
ASN1_STRING *params = NULL;
ASN1_INTEGER *prkey = NULL;
unsigned char *dp = NULL;
int dplen;
if (pkey->pkey.dsa == NULL|| pkey->pkey.dsa->priv_key == NULL) {
ERR_raise(ERR_LIB_DSA, DSA_R_MISSING_PARAMETERS);
goto err;
}
params = ASN1_STRING_new();
if (params == NULL) {
ERR_raise(ERR_LIB_DSA, ERR_R_MALLOC_FAILURE);
goto err;
}
params->length = i2d_DSAparams(pkey->pkey.dsa, &params->data);
if (params->length <= 0) {
ERR_raise(ERR_LIB_DSA, ERR_R_MALLOC_FAILURE);
goto err;
}
params->type = V_ASN1_SEQUENCE;
/* Get private key into integer */
prkey = BN_to_ASN1_INTEGER(pkey->pkey.dsa->priv_key, NULL);
if (prkey == NULL) {
ERR_raise(ERR_LIB_DSA, DSA_R_BN_ERROR);
goto err;
}
dplen = i2d_ASN1_INTEGER(prkey, &dp);
ASN1_STRING_clear_free(prkey);
prkey = NULL;
if (!PKCS8_pkey_set0(p8, OBJ_nid2obj(NID_dsa), 0,
V_ASN1_SEQUENCE, params, dp, dplen))
goto err;
return 1;
err:
OPENSSL_free(dp);
ASN1_STRING_free(params);
ASN1_STRING_clear_free(prkey);
return 0;
}
static int int_dsa_size(const EVP_PKEY *pkey)
{
return DSA_size(pkey->pkey.dsa);
}
static int dsa_bits(const EVP_PKEY *pkey)
{
return DSA_bits(pkey->pkey.dsa);
}
static int dsa_security_bits(const EVP_PKEY *pkey)
{
return DSA_security_bits(pkey->pkey.dsa);
}
static int dsa_missing_parameters(const EVP_PKEY *pkey)
{
DSA *dsa;
dsa = pkey->pkey.dsa;
return dsa == NULL
|| dsa->params.p == NULL
|| dsa->params.q == NULL
|| dsa->params.g == NULL;
}
static int dsa_copy_parameters(EVP_PKEY *to, const EVP_PKEY *from)
{
if (to->pkey.dsa == NULL) {
to->pkey.dsa = DSA_new();
if (to->pkey.dsa == NULL)
return 0;
}
if (!ossl_ffc_params_copy(&to->pkey.dsa->params, &from->pkey.dsa->params))
return 0;
to->pkey.dsa->dirty_cnt++;
return 1;
}
static int dsa_cmp_parameters(const EVP_PKEY *a, const EVP_PKEY *b)
{
return ossl_ffc_params_cmp(&a->pkey.dsa->params, &b->pkey.dsa->params, 1);
}
static int dsa_pub_cmp(const EVP_PKEY *a, const EVP_PKEY *b)
{
return BN_cmp(b->pkey.dsa->pub_key, a->pkey.dsa->pub_key) == 0;
}
static void int_dsa_free(EVP_PKEY *pkey)
{
DSA_free(pkey->pkey.dsa);
}
static int do_dsa_print(BIO *bp, const DSA *x, int off, int ptype)
{
int ret = 0;
const char *ktype = NULL;
const BIGNUM *priv_key, *pub_key;
int mod_len = 0;
if (x->params.p != NULL)
mod_len = DSA_bits(x);
if (ptype == 2)
priv_key = x->priv_key;
else
priv_key = NULL;
if (ptype > 0)
pub_key = x->pub_key;
else
pub_key = NULL;
if (ptype == 2)
ktype = "Private-Key";
else if (ptype == 1)
ktype = "Public-Key";
else
ktype = "DSA-Parameters";
if (priv_key != NULL) {
if (!BIO_indent(bp, off, 128))
goto err;
if (BIO_printf(bp, "%s: (%d bit)\n", ktype, mod_len) <= 0)
goto err;
} else {
if (BIO_printf(bp, "Public-Key: (%d bit)\n", mod_len) <= 0)
goto err;
}
if (!ASN1_bn_print(bp, "priv:", priv_key, NULL, off))
goto err;
if (!ASN1_bn_print(bp, "pub: ", pub_key, NULL, off))
goto err;
if (!ossl_ffc_params_print(bp, &x->params, off))
goto err;
ret = 1;
err:
return ret;
}
static int dsa_param_decode(EVP_PKEY *pkey,
const unsigned char **pder, int derlen)
{
DSA *dsa;
if ((dsa = d2i_DSAparams(NULL, pder, derlen)) == NULL)
return 0;
dsa->dirty_cnt++;
EVP_PKEY_assign_DSA(pkey, dsa);
return 1;
}
static int dsa_param_encode(const EVP_PKEY *pkey, unsigned char **pder)
{
return i2d_DSAparams(pkey->pkey.dsa, pder);
}
static int dsa_param_print(BIO *bp, const EVP_PKEY *pkey, int indent,
ASN1_PCTX *ctx)
{
return do_dsa_print(bp, pkey->pkey.dsa, indent, 0);
}
static int dsa_pub_print(BIO *bp, const EVP_PKEY *pkey, int indent,
ASN1_PCTX *ctx)
{
return do_dsa_print(bp, pkey->pkey.dsa, indent, 1);
}
static int dsa_priv_print(BIO *bp, const EVP_PKEY *pkey, int indent,
ASN1_PCTX *ctx)
{
return do_dsa_print(bp, pkey->pkey.dsa, indent, 2);
}
static int old_dsa_priv_decode(EVP_PKEY *pkey,
const unsigned char **pder, int derlen)
{
DSA *dsa;
if ((dsa = d2i_DSAPrivateKey(NULL, pder, derlen)) == NULL) {
ERR_raise(ERR_LIB_DSA, ERR_R_DSA_LIB);
return 0;
}
dsa->dirty_cnt++;
EVP_PKEY_assign_DSA(pkey, dsa);
return 1;
}
static int old_dsa_priv_encode(const EVP_PKEY *pkey, unsigned char **pder)
{
return i2d_DSAPrivateKey(pkey->pkey.dsa, pder);
}
static int dsa_sig_print(BIO *bp, const X509_ALGOR *sigalg,
const ASN1_STRING *sig, int indent, ASN1_PCTX *pctx)
{
DSA_SIG *dsa_sig;
const unsigned char *p;
if (sig == NULL) {
if (BIO_puts(bp, "\n") <= 0)
return 0;
else
return 1;
}
p = sig->data;
dsa_sig = d2i_DSA_SIG(NULL, &p, sig->length);
if (dsa_sig != NULL) {
int rv = 0;
const BIGNUM *r, *s;
DSA_SIG_get0(dsa_sig, &r, &s);
if (BIO_write(bp, "\n", 1) != 1)
goto err;
if (!ASN1_bn_print(bp, "r: ", r, NULL, indent))
goto err;
if (!ASN1_bn_print(bp, "s: ", s, NULL, indent))
goto err;
rv = 1;
err:
DSA_SIG_free(dsa_sig);
return rv;
}
if (BIO_puts(bp, "\n") <= 0)
return 0;
return X509_signature_dump(bp, sig, indent);
}
static int dsa_pkey_ctrl(EVP_PKEY *pkey, int op, long arg1, void *arg2)
{
switch (op) {
case ASN1_PKEY_CTRL_DEFAULT_MD_NID:
*(int *)arg2 = NID_sha256;
return 1;
default:
return -2;
}
}
static size_t dsa_pkey_dirty_cnt(const EVP_PKEY *pkey)
{
return pkey->pkey.dsa->dirty_cnt;
}
Redesign the KEYMGMT libcrypto <-> provider interface - the basics The KEYMGMT libcrypto <-> provider interface currently makes a few assumptions: 1. provider side domain parameters and key data isn't mutable. In other words, as soon as a key has been created in any (loaded, imported data, ...), it's set in stone. 2. provider side domain parameters can be strictly separated from the key data. This does work for the most part, but there are places where that's a bit too rigid for the functionality that the EVP_PKEY API delivers. Key data needs to be mutable to allow the flexibility that functions like EVP_PKEY_copy_parameters promise, as well as to provide the combinations of data that an EVP_PKEY is generally assumed to be able to hold: - domain parameters only - public key only - public key + private key - domain parameters + public key - domain parameters + public key + private key To remedy all this, we: 1. let go of the distinction between domain parameters and key material proper in the libcrypto <-> provider interface. As a consequence, functions that still need it gain a selection argument, which is a set of bits that indicate what parts of the key object are to be considered in a specific call. This allows a reduction of very similar functions into one. 2. Rework the libcrypto <-> provider interface so provider side key objects are created and destructed with a separate function, and get their data filled and extracted in through import and export. (future work will see other key object constructors and other functions to fill them with data) Fixes #10979 squash! Redesign the KEYMGMT libcrypto <-> provider interface - the basics Remedy 1 needs a rewrite: Reviewed-by: Matt Caswell <matt@openssl.org> Reviewed-by: Shane Lontis <shane.lontis@oracle.com> Reviewed-by: Paul Dale <paul.dale@oracle.com> (Merged from https://github.com/openssl/openssl/pull/11006)
2020-02-02 17:56:07 +00:00
static int dsa_pkey_export_to(const EVP_PKEY *from, void *to_keydata,
EVP_KEYMGMT *to_keymgmt, OSSL_LIB_CTX *libctx,
const char *propq)
{
Redesign the KEYMGMT libcrypto <-> provider interface - the basics The KEYMGMT libcrypto <-> provider interface currently makes a few assumptions: 1. provider side domain parameters and key data isn't mutable. In other words, as soon as a key has been created in any (loaded, imported data, ...), it's set in stone. 2. provider side domain parameters can be strictly separated from the key data. This does work for the most part, but there are places where that's a bit too rigid for the functionality that the EVP_PKEY API delivers. Key data needs to be mutable to allow the flexibility that functions like EVP_PKEY_copy_parameters promise, as well as to provide the combinations of data that an EVP_PKEY is generally assumed to be able to hold: - domain parameters only - public key only - public key + private key - domain parameters + public key - domain parameters + public key + private key To remedy all this, we: 1. let go of the distinction between domain parameters and key material proper in the libcrypto <-> provider interface. As a consequence, functions that still need it gain a selection argument, which is a set of bits that indicate what parts of the key object are to be considered in a specific call. This allows a reduction of very similar functions into one. 2. Rework the libcrypto <-> provider interface so provider side key objects are created and destructed with a separate function, and get their data filled and extracted in through import and export. (future work will see other key object constructors and other functions to fill them with data) Fixes #10979 squash! Redesign the KEYMGMT libcrypto <-> provider interface - the basics Remedy 1 needs a rewrite: Reviewed-by: Matt Caswell <matt@openssl.org> Reviewed-by: Shane Lontis <shane.lontis@oracle.com> Reviewed-by: Paul Dale <paul.dale@oracle.com> (Merged from https://github.com/openssl/openssl/pull/11006)
2020-02-02 17:56:07 +00:00
DSA *dsa = from->pkey.dsa;
OSSL_PARAM_BLD *tmpl;
const BIGNUM *p = DSA_get0_p(dsa), *g = DSA_get0_g(dsa);
const BIGNUM *q = DSA_get0_q(dsa), *pub_key = DSA_get0_pub_key(dsa);
const BIGNUM *priv_key = DSA_get0_priv_key(dsa);
OSSL_PARAM *params;
int selection = 0;
int rv = 0;
/*
* If the DSA method is foreign, then we can't be sure of anything, and
* can therefore not export or pretend to export.
*/
if (DSA_get_method(dsa) != DSA_OpenSSL())
return 0;
if (p == NULL || q == NULL || g == NULL)
Redesign the KEYMGMT libcrypto <-> provider interface - the basics The KEYMGMT libcrypto <-> provider interface currently makes a few assumptions: 1. provider side domain parameters and key data isn't mutable. In other words, as soon as a key has been created in any (loaded, imported data, ...), it's set in stone. 2. provider side domain parameters can be strictly separated from the key data. This does work for the most part, but there are places where that's a bit too rigid for the functionality that the EVP_PKEY API delivers. Key data needs to be mutable to allow the flexibility that functions like EVP_PKEY_copy_parameters promise, as well as to provide the combinations of data that an EVP_PKEY is generally assumed to be able to hold: - domain parameters only - public key only - public key + private key - domain parameters + public key - domain parameters + public key + private key To remedy all this, we: 1. let go of the distinction between domain parameters and key material proper in the libcrypto <-> provider interface. As a consequence, functions that still need it gain a selection argument, which is a set of bits that indicate what parts of the key object are to be considered in a specific call. This allows a reduction of very similar functions into one. 2. Rework the libcrypto <-> provider interface so provider side key objects are created and destructed with a separate function, and get their data filled and extracted in through import and export. (future work will see other key object constructors and other functions to fill them with data) Fixes #10979 squash! Redesign the KEYMGMT libcrypto <-> provider interface - the basics Remedy 1 needs a rewrite: Reviewed-by: Matt Caswell <matt@openssl.org> Reviewed-by: Shane Lontis <shane.lontis@oracle.com> Reviewed-by: Paul Dale <paul.dale@oracle.com> (Merged from https://github.com/openssl/openssl/pull/11006)
2020-02-02 17:56:07 +00:00
return 0;
tmpl = OSSL_PARAM_BLD_new();
if (tmpl == NULL)
Redesign the KEYMGMT libcrypto <-> provider interface - the basics The KEYMGMT libcrypto <-> provider interface currently makes a few assumptions: 1. provider side domain parameters and key data isn't mutable. In other words, as soon as a key has been created in any (loaded, imported data, ...), it's set in stone. 2. provider side domain parameters can be strictly separated from the key data. This does work for the most part, but there are places where that's a bit too rigid for the functionality that the EVP_PKEY API delivers. Key data needs to be mutable to allow the flexibility that functions like EVP_PKEY_copy_parameters promise, as well as to provide the combinations of data that an EVP_PKEY is generally assumed to be able to hold: - domain parameters only - public key only - public key + private key - domain parameters + public key - domain parameters + public key + private key To remedy all this, we: 1. let go of the distinction between domain parameters and key material proper in the libcrypto <-> provider interface. As a consequence, functions that still need it gain a selection argument, which is a set of bits that indicate what parts of the key object are to be considered in a specific call. This allows a reduction of very similar functions into one. 2. Rework the libcrypto <-> provider interface so provider side key objects are created and destructed with a separate function, and get their data filled and extracted in through import and export. (future work will see other key object constructors and other functions to fill them with data) Fixes #10979 squash! Redesign the KEYMGMT libcrypto <-> provider interface - the basics Remedy 1 needs a rewrite: Reviewed-by: Matt Caswell <matt@openssl.org> Reviewed-by: Shane Lontis <shane.lontis@oracle.com> Reviewed-by: Paul Dale <paul.dale@oracle.com> (Merged from https://github.com/openssl/openssl/pull/11006)
2020-02-02 17:56:07 +00:00
return 0;
if (!OSSL_PARAM_BLD_push_BN(tmpl, OSSL_PKEY_PARAM_FFC_P, p)
|| !OSSL_PARAM_BLD_push_BN(tmpl, OSSL_PKEY_PARAM_FFC_Q, q)
|| !OSSL_PARAM_BLD_push_BN(tmpl, OSSL_PKEY_PARAM_FFC_G, g))
goto err;
selection |= OSSL_KEYMGMT_SELECT_DOMAIN_PARAMETERS;
if (pub_key != NULL) {
if (!OSSL_PARAM_BLD_push_BN(tmpl, OSSL_PKEY_PARAM_PUB_KEY,
pub_key))
goto err;
selection |= OSSL_KEYMGMT_SELECT_PUBLIC_KEY;
}
Redesign the KEYMGMT libcrypto <-> provider interface - the basics The KEYMGMT libcrypto <-> provider interface currently makes a few assumptions: 1. provider side domain parameters and key data isn't mutable. In other words, as soon as a key has been created in any (loaded, imported data, ...), it's set in stone. 2. provider side domain parameters can be strictly separated from the key data. This does work for the most part, but there are places where that's a bit too rigid for the functionality that the EVP_PKEY API delivers. Key data needs to be mutable to allow the flexibility that functions like EVP_PKEY_copy_parameters promise, as well as to provide the combinations of data that an EVP_PKEY is generally assumed to be able to hold: - domain parameters only - public key only - public key + private key - domain parameters + public key - domain parameters + public key + private key To remedy all this, we: 1. let go of the distinction between domain parameters and key material proper in the libcrypto <-> provider interface. As a consequence, functions that still need it gain a selection argument, which is a set of bits that indicate what parts of the key object are to be considered in a specific call. This allows a reduction of very similar functions into one. 2. Rework the libcrypto <-> provider interface so provider side key objects are created and destructed with a separate function, and get their data filled and extracted in through import and export. (future work will see other key object constructors and other functions to fill them with data) Fixes #10979 squash! Redesign the KEYMGMT libcrypto <-> provider interface - the basics Remedy 1 needs a rewrite: Reviewed-by: Matt Caswell <matt@openssl.org> Reviewed-by: Shane Lontis <shane.lontis@oracle.com> Reviewed-by: Paul Dale <paul.dale@oracle.com> (Merged from https://github.com/openssl/openssl/pull/11006)
2020-02-02 17:56:07 +00:00
if (priv_key != NULL) {
if (!OSSL_PARAM_BLD_push_BN(tmpl, OSSL_PKEY_PARAM_PRIV_KEY,
Redesign the KEYMGMT libcrypto <-> provider interface - the basics The KEYMGMT libcrypto <-> provider interface currently makes a few assumptions: 1. provider side domain parameters and key data isn't mutable. In other words, as soon as a key has been created in any (loaded, imported data, ...), it's set in stone. 2. provider side domain parameters can be strictly separated from the key data. This does work for the most part, but there are places where that's a bit too rigid for the functionality that the EVP_PKEY API delivers. Key data needs to be mutable to allow the flexibility that functions like EVP_PKEY_copy_parameters promise, as well as to provide the combinations of data that an EVP_PKEY is generally assumed to be able to hold: - domain parameters only - public key only - public key + private key - domain parameters + public key - domain parameters + public key + private key To remedy all this, we: 1. let go of the distinction between domain parameters and key material proper in the libcrypto <-> provider interface. As a consequence, functions that still need it gain a selection argument, which is a set of bits that indicate what parts of the key object are to be considered in a specific call. This allows a reduction of very similar functions into one. 2. Rework the libcrypto <-> provider interface so provider side key objects are created and destructed with a separate function, and get their data filled and extracted in through import and export. (future work will see other key object constructors and other functions to fill them with data) Fixes #10979 squash! Redesign the KEYMGMT libcrypto <-> provider interface - the basics Remedy 1 needs a rewrite: Reviewed-by: Matt Caswell <matt@openssl.org> Reviewed-by: Shane Lontis <shane.lontis@oracle.com> Reviewed-by: Paul Dale <paul.dale@oracle.com> (Merged from https://github.com/openssl/openssl/pull/11006)
2020-02-02 17:56:07 +00:00
priv_key))
goto err;
selection |= OSSL_KEYMGMT_SELECT_PRIVATE_KEY;
}
if ((params = OSSL_PARAM_BLD_to_param(tmpl)) == NULL)
goto err;
/* We export, the provider imports */
rv = evp_keymgmt_import(to_keymgmt, to_keydata, selection, params);
OSSL_PARAM_free(params);
err:
OSSL_PARAM_BLD_free(tmpl);
Redesign the KEYMGMT libcrypto <-> provider interface - the basics The KEYMGMT libcrypto <-> provider interface currently makes a few assumptions: 1. provider side domain parameters and key data isn't mutable. In other words, as soon as a key has been created in any (loaded, imported data, ...), it's set in stone. 2. provider side domain parameters can be strictly separated from the key data. This does work for the most part, but there are places where that's a bit too rigid for the functionality that the EVP_PKEY API delivers. Key data needs to be mutable to allow the flexibility that functions like EVP_PKEY_copy_parameters promise, as well as to provide the combinations of data that an EVP_PKEY is generally assumed to be able to hold: - domain parameters only - public key only - public key + private key - domain parameters + public key - domain parameters + public key + private key To remedy all this, we: 1. let go of the distinction between domain parameters and key material proper in the libcrypto <-> provider interface. As a consequence, functions that still need it gain a selection argument, which is a set of bits that indicate what parts of the key object are to be considered in a specific call. This allows a reduction of very similar functions into one. 2. Rework the libcrypto <-> provider interface so provider side key objects are created and destructed with a separate function, and get their data filled and extracted in through import and export. (future work will see other key object constructors and other functions to fill them with data) Fixes #10979 squash! Redesign the KEYMGMT libcrypto <-> provider interface - the basics Remedy 1 needs a rewrite: Reviewed-by: Matt Caswell <matt@openssl.org> Reviewed-by: Shane Lontis <shane.lontis@oracle.com> Reviewed-by: Paul Dale <paul.dale@oracle.com> (Merged from https://github.com/openssl/openssl/pull/11006)
2020-02-02 17:56:07 +00:00
return rv;
}
static int dsa_pkey_import_from(const OSSL_PARAM params[], void *vpctx)
{
EVP_PKEY_CTX *pctx = vpctx;
EVP_PKEY *pkey = EVP_PKEY_CTX_get0_pkey(pctx);
DSA *dsa = ossl_dsa_new(pctx->libctx);
if (dsa == NULL) {
ERR_raise(ERR_LIB_DSA, ERR_R_MALLOC_FAILURE);
return 0;
}
if (!ossl_dsa_ffc_params_fromdata(dsa, params)
|| !ossl_dsa_key_fromdata(dsa, params)
|| !EVP_PKEY_assign_DSA(pkey, dsa)) {
DSA_free(dsa);
return 0;
}
return 1;
}
static ossl_inline int dsa_bn_dup_check(BIGNUM **out, const BIGNUM *f)
{
if (f != NULL && (*out = BN_dup(f)) == NULL)
return 0;
return 1;
}
static DSA *dsa_dup(const DSA *dsa)
{
DSA *dupkey = NULL;
/* Do not try to duplicate foreign DSA keys */
if (DSA_get_method((DSA *)dsa) != DSA_OpenSSL())
return NULL;
if ((dupkey = ossl_dsa_new(dsa->libctx)) == NULL)
return NULL;
if (!ossl_ffc_params_copy(&dupkey->params, &dsa->params))
goto err;
dupkey->flags = dsa->flags;
if (!dsa_bn_dup_check(&dupkey->pub_key, dsa->pub_key))
goto err;
if (!dsa_bn_dup_check(&dupkey->priv_key, dsa->priv_key))
goto err;
if (!CRYPTO_dup_ex_data(CRYPTO_EX_INDEX_DSA,
&dupkey->ex_data, &dsa->ex_data))
goto err;
return dupkey;
err:
DSA_free(dupkey);
return NULL;
}
static int dsa_pkey_copy(EVP_PKEY *to, EVP_PKEY *from)
{
DSA *dsa = from->pkey.dsa;
DSA *dupkey = NULL;
int ret;
if (dsa != NULL) {
dupkey = dsa_dup(dsa);
if (dupkey == NULL)
return 0;
}
ret = EVP_PKEY_assign_DSA(to, dupkey);
if (!ret)
DSA_free(dupkey);
return ret;
}
/* NB these are sorted in pkey_id order, lowest first */
const EVP_PKEY_ASN1_METHOD ossl_dsa_asn1_meths[5] = {
{
EVP_PKEY_DSA2,
EVP_PKEY_DSA,
ASN1_PKEY_ALIAS},
{
EVP_PKEY_DSA1,
EVP_PKEY_DSA,
ASN1_PKEY_ALIAS},
{
EVP_PKEY_DSA4,
EVP_PKEY_DSA,
ASN1_PKEY_ALIAS},
{
EVP_PKEY_DSA3,
EVP_PKEY_DSA,
ASN1_PKEY_ALIAS},
{
EVP_PKEY_DSA,
EVP_PKEY_DSA,
0,
"DSA",
"OpenSSL DSA method",
dsa_pub_decode,
dsa_pub_encode,
dsa_pub_cmp,
dsa_pub_print,
dsa_priv_decode,
dsa_priv_encode,
dsa_priv_print,
int_dsa_size,
dsa_bits,
dsa_security_bits,
dsa_param_decode,
dsa_param_encode,
dsa_missing_parameters,
dsa_copy_parameters,
dsa_cmp_parameters,
dsa_param_print,
dsa_sig_print,
int_dsa_free,
dsa_pkey_ctrl,
old_dsa_priv_decode,
old_dsa_priv_encode,
NULL, NULL, NULL,
NULL, NULL, NULL,
NULL, NULL, NULL, NULL,
dsa_pkey_dirty_cnt,
dsa_pkey_export_to,
dsa_pkey_import_from,
dsa_pkey_copy
}
};