mirror of https://github.com/openssl/openssl
More typo fixes
Fix some comments too [skip ci] Reviewed-by: Tim Hudson <tjh@openssl.org> Reviewed-by: Richard Levitte <levitte@openssl.org> (Merged from https://github.com/openssl/openssl/pull/3069)
This commit is contained in:
FdaSilvaYY
Richard Levitte
parent
7bd278957d
commit
69687aa829
2
CHANGES
2
CHANGES
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@ -466,7 +466,7 @@
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*) Add X25519 support.
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Add ASN.1 and EVP_PKEY methods for X25519. This includes support
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for public and private key encoding using the format documented in
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draft-ietf-curdle-pkix-02. The coresponding EVP_PKEY method supports
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draft-ietf-curdle-pkix-02. The corresponding EVP_PKEY method supports
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key generation and key derivation.
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TLS support complies with draft-ietf-tls-rfc4492bis-08 and uses
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@ -2580,7 +2580,7 @@ sub isabsolute {
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# On non-platforms, we just use file_name_is_absolute().
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return file_name_is_absolute($file) unless $^O eq "VMS";
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# If the file spec includes a device or a directpry spec,
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# If the file spec includes a device or a directory spec,
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# file_name_is_absolute() is perfectly safe.
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return file_name_is_absolute($file) if $file =~ m|[:\[]|;
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@ -77,7 +77,7 @@
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$ set image /flag=call_debug [.test]evp_test.exe
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Then just run it and you will find yourself in a debugging session.
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When done, we recomment that you turn that flag back off:
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When done, we recommend that you turn that flag back off:
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$ set image /flag=nocall_debug [.test]evp_test.exe
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@ -70,7 +70,7 @@ typedef enum OPTION_choice {
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const OPTIONS passwd_options[] = {
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{"help", OPT_HELP, '-', "Display this summary"},
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{"in", OPT_IN, '<', "Pead passwords from file"},
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{"in", OPT_IN, '<', "Read passwords from file"},
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{"noverify", OPT_NOVERIFY, '-',
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"Never verify when reading password from terminal"},
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{"quiet", OPT_QUIET, '-', "No warnings"},
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@ -315,7 +315,7 @@ ___
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$r++; unshift(@rndkey,pop(@rndkey));
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};
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sub Xupdate_ssse3_16_31() # recall that $Xi starts wtih 4
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sub Xupdate_ssse3_16_31() # recall that $Xi starts with 4
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{ use integer;
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my $body = shift;
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my @insns = (&$body,&$body,&$body,&$body); # 40 instructions
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@ -1188,7 +1188,7 @@ ___
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$r++; unshift(@rndkey,pop(@rndkey));
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};
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sub Xupdate_avx_16_31() # recall that $Xi starts wtih 4
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sub Xupdate_avx_16_31() # recall that $Xi starts with 4
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{ use integer;
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my $body = shift;
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my @insns = (&$body,&$body,&$body,&$body); # 40 instructions
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@ -762,7 +762,7 @@ int BIO_lookup(const char *host, const char *service,
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* it was errno. To minimize mixup add 1000. Underlying
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* reason for this is that hstrerror is declared obsolete,
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* not to mention that a) h_errno is not always guaranteed
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* to be meanigless; b) hstrerror can reside in yet another
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* to be meaningless; b) hstrerror can reside in yet another
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* library, linking for sake of hstrerror is an overkill;
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* c) this path is not executed on contemporary systems
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* anyway [above getaddrinfo/gai_strerror is]. We just let
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@ -30,7 +30,7 @@
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# instructions...
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# (*) Engine accessing the driver in question is on my TODO list.
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# For reference, acceleator is estimated to give 6 to 10 times
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# For reference, accelerator is estimated to give 6 to 10 times
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# improvement on single-threaded RSA sign. It should be noted
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# that 6-10x improvement coefficient does not actually mean
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# something extraordinary in terms of absolute [single-threaded]
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@ -316,7 +316,7 @@ int PEM_ASN1_write_bio(i2d_of_void *i2d, const char *name, BIO *bp,
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dsize = 0;
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goto err;
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}
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/* dzise + 8 bytes are needed */
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/* dsize + 8 bytes are needed */
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/* actually it needs the cipher block size extra... */
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data = OPENSSL_malloc((unsigned int)dsize + 20);
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if (data == NULL) {
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@ -661,7 +661,7 @@ my $_ror=sub { &ror(@_) };
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&jmp (&label("loop"));
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######################################################################
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# SSE instruction sequence is first broken to groups of indepentent
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# SSE instruction sequence is first broken to groups of independent
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# instructions, independent in respect to their inputs and shifter
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# (not all architectures have more than one). Then IALU instructions
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# are "knitted in" between the SSE groups. Distance is maintained for
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@ -670,14 +670,14 @@ my $_ror=sub { &ror(@_) };
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#
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# Temporary registers usage. X[2] is volatile at the entry and at the
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# end is restored from backtrace ring buffer. X[3] is expected to
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# contain current K_XX_XX constant and is used to caclulate X[-1]+K
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# contain current K_XX_XX constant and is used to calculate X[-1]+K
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# from previous round, it becomes volatile the moment the value is
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# saved to stack for transfer to IALU. X[4] becomes volatile whenever
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# X[-4] is accumulated and offloaded to backtrace ring buffer, at the
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# end it is loaded with next K_XX_XX [which becomes X[3] in next
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# round]...
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#
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sub Xupdate_ssse3_16_31() # recall that $Xi starts wtih 4
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sub Xupdate_ssse3_16_31() # recall that $Xi starts with 4
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{ use integer;
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my $body = shift;
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my @insns = (&$body,&$body,&$body,&$body); # 40 instructions
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@ -1200,7 +1200,7 @@ my $_ror=sub { &shrd(@_[0],@_) };
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&and (@T[0],@T[1]);
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&jmp (&label("loop"));
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sub Xupdate_avx_16_31() # recall that $Xi starts wtih 4
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sub Xupdate_avx_16_31() # recall that $Xi starts with 4
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{ use integer;
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my $body = shift;
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my @insns = (&$body,&$body,&$body,&$body); # 40 instructions
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@ -577,7 +577,7 @@ sub AUTOLOAD() # thunk [simplified] 32-bit style perlasm
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$code .= "\t$opcode\t".join(',',$arg,reverse @_)."\n";
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}
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sub Xupdate_ssse3_16_31() # recall that $Xi starts wtih 4
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sub Xupdate_ssse3_16_31() # recall that $Xi starts with 4
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{ use integer;
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my $body = shift;
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my @insns = (&$body,&$body,&$body,&$body); # 40 instructions
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@ -1042,7 +1042,7 @@ $code.=<<___;
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jmp .Loop_avx
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___
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sub Xupdate_avx_16_31() # recall that $Xi starts wtih 4
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sub Xupdate_avx_16_31() # recall that $Xi starts with 4
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{ use integer;
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my $body = shift;
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my @insns = (&$body,&$body,&$body,&$body); # 40 instructions
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@ -1526,7 +1526,7 @@ sub bodyx_40_59 () { # 10 instructions, 3 cycles critical path
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)
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}
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sub Xupdate_avx2_16_31() # recall that $Xi starts wtih 4
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sub Xupdate_avx2_16_31() # recall that $Xi starts with 4
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{ use integer;
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my $body = shift;
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my @insns = (&$body,&$body,&$body,&$body,&$body); # 35 instructions
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@ -283,7 +283,7 @@ for (@ARGV) { $sse2=1 if (/-DOPENSSL_IA32_SSE2/); }
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&set_label("spin");
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&lea ("ebx",&DWP(0,"eax","ecx"));
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&nop ();
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&data_word(0x1ab10ff0); # lock; cmpxchg %ebx,(%edx) # %eax is envolved and is always reloaded
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&data_word(0x1ab10ff0); # lock; cmpxchg %ebx,(%edx) # %eax is involved and is always reloaded
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&jne (&label("spin"));
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&mov ("eax","ebx"); # OpenSSL expects the new value
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&pop ("ebx");
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@ -2,7 +2,7 @@
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README This file
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fingerprints.txt
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PGP fingerprints of authoried release signers
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PGP fingerprints of authorised release signers
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standards.txt
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Moved to the web, https://www.openssl.org/docs/standards.html
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@ -21,7 +21,7 @@ BN_rand, BN_pseudo_rand, BN_rand_range, BN_pseudo_rand_range - generate pseudo-r
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BN_rand() generates a cryptographically strong pseudo-random number of
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B<bits> in length and stores it in B<rnd>.
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If B<bits> is less than zero, or too small to
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accomodate the requirements specified by the B<top> and B<bottom>
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accommodate the requirements specified by the B<top> and B<bottom>
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parameters, an error is returned.
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The B<top> parameters specifies
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requirements on the most significant bit of the generated number.
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@ -162,7 +162,7 @@ SCT_set_version() returns 1 if the specified version is supported, 0 otherwise.
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SCT_set_log_entry_type() returns 1 if the specified log entry type is supported, 0 otherwise.
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SCT_set0_log_id() and B<SCT_set1_log_id> return 1 if the specified LogID is a
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valid SHA-256 hash, 0 otherwise. Aditionally, B<SCT_set1_log_id> returns 0 if
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valid SHA-256 hash, 0 otherwise. Additionally, B<SCT_set1_log_id> returns 0 if
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malloc fails.
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B<SCT_set_signature_nid> returns 1 if the specified NID is supported, 0 otherwise.
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@ -20,7 +20,7 @@ returned value (unless L<X509_up_ref(3)> has also been called).
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=head1 RETURN VALUES
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SSL_SESSION_get0_peer() returns a pointer to the peer certificate or NULL if
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no peer certificat is available.
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no peer certificate is available.
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=head1 SEE ALSO
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@ -63,7 +63,7 @@ previously set value, then no additional references are consumed.
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=item *
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If the rbio and wbio parameters are different and the rbio is the same as the
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previously set value then one reference is consumbed for the wbio and no
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previously set value then one reference is consumed for the wbio and no
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references are consumed for the rbio.
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=item *
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@ -269,7 +269,7 @@ is used to specify a verification time, the check is not suppressed.
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=head1 INHERITANCE FLAGS
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These flags spevify how parameters are "inherited" from one structure to
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These flags specify how parameters are "inherited" from one structure to
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another.
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If B<X509_VP_FLAG_ONCE> is set then the current setting is zeroed
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@ -36,7 +36,7 @@ output in PEM format:
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EVP_PKEY_CTX_free(pctx);
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PEM_write_PrivateKey(stdout, pkey, NULL, NULL, 0, NULL, NULL);
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The key derviation example in L<EVP_PKEY_derive(3)> can be used with
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The key derivation example in L<EVP_PKEY_derive(3)> can be used with
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B<X25519>.
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=head1 SEE ALSO
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@ -139,7 +139,7 @@ DSO_METHOD *DSO_METHOD_openssl(void);
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* This function writes null-terminated pathname of DSO module containing
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* 'addr' into 'sz' large caller-provided 'path' and returns the number of
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* characters [including trailing zero] written to it. If 'sz' is 0 or
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* negative, 'path' is ignored and required amount of charachers [including
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* negative, 'path' is ignored and required amount of characters [including
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* trailing zero] to accommodate pathname is returned. If 'addr' is NULL, then
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* pathname of cryptolib itself is returned. Negative or zero return value
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* denotes error.
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@ -170,7 +170,7 @@ extern "C" {
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/*
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* This is used with memory BIOs:
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* BIO_FLAGS_MEM_RDONLY means we shouldn't free up or change the data in any way;
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* BIO_FLAGS_NONCLEAR_RST means we should't clear data on reset.
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* BIO_FLAGS_NONCLEAR_RST means we shouldn't clear data on reset.
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*/
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# define BIO_FLAGS_MEM_RDONLY 0x200
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# define BIO_FLAGS_NONCLEAR_RST 0x400
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@ -91,7 +91,7 @@ const void *OBJ_bsearch_ex_(const void *key, const void *base, int num,
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* const void *a_;
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* const nid_triple const *a = a_;
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*
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* The assignement discards a const because what you really want is:
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* The assignment discards a const because what you really want is:
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*
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* const int const * const *a = a_;
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*
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@ -99,7 +99,7 @@ const void *OBJ_bsearch_ex_(const void *key, const void *base, int num,
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* which breaks comparison functions.
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*
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* Thus we end up having to cast, sadly, or unpack the
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* declarations. Or, as I finally did in this case, delcare nid_triple
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* declarations. Or, as I finally did in this case, declare nid_triple
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* to be a struct, which it should have been in the first place.
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*
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* Ben, August 2008.
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@ -207,7 +207,7 @@ const UI_METHOD *UI_set_method(UI *ui, const UI_METHOD *meth);
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UI_METHOD *UI_OpenSSL(void);
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/*
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* NULL method. Literarily does nothing, but may serve as a placeholder
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* NULL method. Literally does nothing, but may serve as a placeholder
|
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* to avoid internal default.
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*/
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const UI_METHOD *UI_null(void);
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@ -641,7 +641,7 @@ int X509_get_signature_type(const X509 *x);
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/*
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* This one is only used so that a binary form can output, as in
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* i2d_X509_NAME(X509_get_X509_PUBKEY(x),&buf)
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* i2d_X509_NAME(X509_get_X509_PUBKEY(x), &buf)
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*/
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X509_PUBKEY *X509_get_X509_PUBKEY(const X509 *x);
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const STACK_OF(X509_EXTENSION) *X509_get0_extensions(const X509 *x);
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@ -1662,8 +1662,7 @@ int dtls1_process_record(SSL *s, DTLS1_BITMAP *bitmap)
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}
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/*
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* retrieve a buffered record that belongs to the current epoch, ie,
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* processed
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* Retrieve a buffered record that belongs to the current epoch, i.e. processed
|
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*/
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#define dtls1_get_processed_record(s) \
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dtls1_retrieve_buffered_record((s), \
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@ -741,7 +741,7 @@ int SSL_has_matching_session_id(const SSL *ssl, const unsigned char *id,
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{
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/*
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* A quick examination of SSL_SESSION_hash and SSL_SESSION_cmp shows how
|
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* we can "construct" a session to give us the desired check - ie. to
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* we can "construct" a session to give us the desired check - i.e. to
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* find if there's a session in the hash table that would conflict with
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* any new session built out of this id/id_len and the ssl_version in use
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* by this SSL.
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@ -2546,8 +2546,8 @@ void SSL_CTX_set_alpn_select_cb(SSL_CTX *ctx,
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}
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/*
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* SSL_get0_alpn_selected gets the selected ALPN protocol (if any) from
|
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* |ssl|. On return it sets |*data| to point to |*len| bytes of protocol name
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* SSL_get0_alpn_selected gets the selected ALPN protocol (if any) from |ssl|.
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* On return it sets |*data| to point to |*len| bytes of protocol name
|
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* (not including the leading length-prefix byte). If the server didn't
|
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* respond with a negotiated protocol then |*len| will be zero.
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*/
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@ -3147,10 +3147,7 @@ int SSL_get_error(const SSL *s, int i)
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}
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if (SSL_want_write(s)) {
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/*
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* Access wbio directly - in order to use the buffered bio if
|
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* present
|
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*/
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/* Access wbio directly - in order to use the buffered bio if present */
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bio = s->wbio;
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if (BIO_should_write(bio))
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return (SSL_ERROR_WANT_WRITE);
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@ -3893,7 +3890,7 @@ void SSL_set_not_resumable_session_callback(SSL *ssl,
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/*
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* Allocates new EVP_MD_CTX and sets pointer to it into given pointer
|
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* variable, freeing EVP_MD_CTX previously stored in that variable, if any.
|
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* If EVP_MD pointer is passed, initializes ctx with this md.
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* If EVP_MD pointer is passed, initializes ctx with this |md|.
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* Returns the newly allocated ctx;
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*/
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|
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@ -325,7 +325,7 @@ static const EXTENSION_DEFINITION ext_defs[] = {
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* Verify whether we are allowed to use the extension |type| in the current
|
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* |context|. Returns 1 to indicate the extension is allowed or unknown or 0 to
|
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* indicate the extension is not allowed. If returning 1 then |*found| is set to
|
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* 1 if we found a definition for the extension, and |*idx| is set to its index
|
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* the definition for the extension we found.
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*/
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static int verify_extension(SSL *s, unsigned int context, unsigned int type,
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custom_ext_methods *meths, RAW_EXTENSION *rawexlist,
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|
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@ -1983,7 +1983,7 @@ static int tls_process_ske_dhe(SSL *s, PACKET *pkt, EVP_PKEY **pkey, int *al)
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goto err;
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}
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/* test non-zero pupkey */
|
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/* test non-zero pubkey */
|
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if (BN_is_zero(bnpub_key)) {
|
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*al = SSL_AD_DECODE_ERROR;
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SSLerr(SSL_F_TLS_PROCESS_SKE_DHE, SSL_R_BAD_DH_VALUE);
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|
|
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|
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@ -659,7 +659,7 @@ WORK_STATE ossl_statem_server_pre_work(SSL *s, WORK_STATE wst)
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case TLS_ST_SW_SRVR_HELLO:
|
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if (SSL_IS_DTLS(s)) {
|
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/*
|
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* Messages we write from now on should be bufferred and
|
||||
* Messages we write from now on should be buffered and
|
||||
* retransmitted if necessary, so we need to use the timer now
|
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*/
|
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st->use_timer = 1;
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|
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12
ssl/t1_lib.c
12
ssl/t1_lib.c
|
|
@ -1841,7 +1841,7 @@ static int ssl_check_ca_name(STACK_OF(X509_NAME) *names, X509 *x)
|
|||
* attempting to use them.
|
||||
*/
|
||||
|
||||
/* Flags which need to be set for a certificate when stict mode not set */
|
||||
/* Flags which need to be set for a certificate when strict mode not set */
|
||||
|
||||
#define CERT_PKEY_VALID_FLAGS \
|
||||
(CERT_PKEY_EE_SIGNATURE|CERT_PKEY_EE_PARAM)
|
||||
|
|
@ -2101,7 +2101,7 @@ void tls1_set_cert_validity(SSL *s)
|
|||
tls1_check_chain(s, NULL, NULL, NULL, SSL_PKEY_GOST12_512);
|
||||
}
|
||||
|
||||
/* User level utiity function to check a chain is suitable */
|
||||
/* User level utility function to check a chain is suitable */
|
||||
int SSL_check_chain(SSL *s, X509 *x, EVP_PKEY *pk, STACK_OF(X509) *chain)
|
||||
{
|
||||
return tls1_check_chain(s, x, pk, chain, -1);
|
||||
|
|
@ -2205,8 +2205,8 @@ int ssl_security_cert(SSL *s, SSL_CTX *ctx, X509 *x, int vfy, int is_ee)
|
|||
}
|
||||
|
||||
/*
|
||||
* Check security of a chain, if sk includes the end entity certificate then
|
||||
* x is NULL. If vfy is 1 then we are verifying a peer chain and not sending
|
||||
* Check security of a chain, if |sk| includes the end entity certificate then
|
||||
* |x| is NULL. If |vfy| is 1 then we are verifying a peer chain and not sending
|
||||
* one to the peer. Return values: 1 if ok otherwise error code to use
|
||||
*/
|
||||
|
||||
|
|
@ -2257,7 +2257,7 @@ int tls_choose_sigalg(SSL *s, int *al)
|
|||
int curve = -1, skip_ec = 0;
|
||||
#endif
|
||||
|
||||
/* Look for a certificate matching shared sigaglgs */
|
||||
/* Look for a certificate matching shared sigalgs */
|
||||
for (i = 0; i < s->cert->shared_sigalgslen; i++) {
|
||||
lu = s->cert->shared_sigalgs[i];
|
||||
|
||||
|
|
@ -2304,7 +2304,7 @@ int tls_choose_sigalg(SSL *s, int *al)
|
|||
if (idx == -1)
|
||||
return 1;
|
||||
if (idx == SSL_PKEY_GOST_EC) {
|
||||
/* Work out which GOST certificate is avaiable */
|
||||
/* Work out which GOST certificate is available */
|
||||
if (ssl_has_cert(s, SSL_PKEY_GOST12_512)) {
|
||||
idx = SSL_PKEY_GOST12_512;
|
||||
} else if (ssl_has_cert(s, SSL_PKEY_GOST12_256)) {
|
||||
|
|
|
|||
|
|
@ -454,7 +454,7 @@ int tls13_change_cipher_state(SSL *s, int which)
|
|||
labellen = sizeof(client_handshake_traffic) - 1;
|
||||
log_label = CLIENT_HANDSHAKE_LABEL;
|
||||
/*
|
||||
* The hanshake hash used for the server read/client write handshake
|
||||
* The handshake hash used for the server read/client write handshake
|
||||
* traffic secret is the same as the hash for the server
|
||||
* write/client read handshake traffic secret. However, if we
|
||||
* processed early data then we delay changing the server
|
||||
|
|
|
|||
|
|
@ -332,7 +332,7 @@ IF[{- !$disabled{tests} -}]
|
|||
# test routines. Some of them need to reach internal symbols that aren't
|
||||
# available through the shared library (at least on Linux, Solaris, Windows
|
||||
# and VMS, where the exported symbols are those listed in util/*.num), these
|
||||
# programs are forcebly linked with the static libraries, where all symbols
|
||||
# programs are forcibly linked with the static libraries, where all symbols
|
||||
# are always available. This excludes linking these programs natively on
|
||||
# Windows when building shared libraries, since the static libraries share
|
||||
# names with the DLL import libraries.
|
||||
|
|
|
|||
|
|
@ -1048,7 +1048,7 @@ static bool DoExchange(bssl::UniquePtr<SSL_SESSION> *out_session,
|
|||
}
|
||||
|
||||
// Reset the state to assert later that the callback isn't called in
|
||||
// renegotations.
|
||||
// renegotiations.
|
||||
GetTestState(ssl.get())->got_new_session = false;
|
||||
}
|
||||
|
||||
|
|
|
|||
|
|
@ -119,7 +119,7 @@ $proxy->serverflags("-tls1_2");
|
|||
$proxy->start();
|
||||
ok(TLSProxy::Message->fail(), "Alert before SSLv2 ClientHello test");
|
||||
|
||||
#Unregcognised record type tests
|
||||
#Unrecognised record type tests
|
||||
|
||||
#Test 10: Sending an unrecognised record type in TLS1.2 should fail
|
||||
$proxy->clear();
|
||||
|
|
|
|||
|
|
@ -174,7 +174,7 @@ static int test_record_overflow(int idx)
|
|||
recversion = TLS1_2_VERSION;
|
||||
|
||||
if (!write_record(serverbio, len, SSL3_RT_APPLICATION_DATA, recversion)) {
|
||||
printf("Unable to write encryprted record\n");
|
||||
printf("Unable to write encrypted record\n");
|
||||
goto end;
|
||||
}
|
||||
|
||||
|
|
|
|||
|
|
@ -447,7 +447,7 @@ static int test_keylog_no_master_key(void) {
|
|||
|
||||
/*
|
||||
* Now we want to test that our output data was vaguely sensible. For this
|
||||
* test, we expect no CLIENT_RANDOM entry becuase it doesn't make sense for
|
||||
* test, we expect no CLIENT_RANDOM entry because it doesn't make sense for
|
||||
* TLSv1.3, but we do expect both client and server to emit keys.
|
||||
*/
|
||||
expected.client_handshake_secret_count = 1;
|
||||
|
|
@ -503,7 +503,7 @@ static int full_early_callback(SSL *s, int *al, void *arg)
|
|||
}
|
||||
len = SSL_early_get0_compression_methods(s, &p);
|
||||
if (len != 1 || *p != 0) {
|
||||
printf("Early callback expected comperssion methods mismatch\n");
|
||||
printf("Early callback expected compression methods mismatch\n");
|
||||
return 0;
|
||||
}
|
||||
return 1;
|
||||
|
|
@ -574,7 +574,7 @@ static int execute_test_large_message(const SSL_METHOD *smeth,
|
|||
int certlen;
|
||||
|
||||
if (certbio == NULL) {
|
||||
printf("Can't load the certficate file\n");
|
||||
printf("Can't load the certificate file\n");
|
||||
goto end;
|
||||
}
|
||||
chaincert = PEM_read_bio_X509(certbio, NULL, NULL, NULL);
|
||||
|
|
@ -603,7 +603,7 @@ static int execute_test_large_message(const SSL_METHOD *smeth,
|
|||
* We assume the supplied certificate is big enough so that if we add
|
||||
* NUM_EXTRA_CERTS it will make the overall message large enough. The
|
||||
* default buffer size is requested to be 16k, but due to the way BUF_MEM
|
||||
* works, it ends up allocing a little over 21k (16 * 4/3). So, in this test
|
||||
* works, it ends up allocating a little over 21k (16 * 4/3). So, in this test
|
||||
* we need to have a message larger than that.
|
||||
*/
|
||||
certlen = i2d_X509(chaincert, NULL);
|
||||
|
|
@ -860,11 +860,11 @@ static int test_tlsext_status_type(void)
|
|||
|
||||
/*
|
||||
* We'll just use any old cert for this test - it doesn't have to be an OCSP
|
||||
* specifc one. We'll use the server cert.
|
||||
* specific one. We'll use the server cert.
|
||||
*/
|
||||
certbio = BIO_new_file(cert, "r");
|
||||
if (certbio == NULL) {
|
||||
printf("Can't load the certficate file\n");
|
||||
printf("Can't load the certificate file\n");
|
||||
goto end;
|
||||
}
|
||||
id = OCSP_RESPID_new();
|
||||
|
|
@ -1246,7 +1246,7 @@ static int test_ssl_set_bio(int idx)
|
|||
|
||||
/*
|
||||
* We want to maintain our own refs to these BIO, so do an up ref for each
|
||||
* BIO that will have ownersip transferred in the SSL_set_bio() call
|
||||
* BIO that will have ownership transferred in the SSL_set_bio() call
|
||||
*/
|
||||
if (irbio != NULL)
|
||||
BIO_up_ref(irbio);
|
||||
|
|
@ -1342,7 +1342,7 @@ static int execute_test_ssl_bio(SSL_BIO_TEST_FIXTURE fix)
|
|||
*/
|
||||
BIO_push(sslbio, membio1);
|
||||
|
||||
/* Verify chaning the rbio/wbio directly does not cause leaks */
|
||||
/* Verify changing the rbio/wbio directly does not cause leaks */
|
||||
if (fix.change_bio != NO_BIO_CHANGE) {
|
||||
membio2 = BIO_new(BIO_s_mem());
|
||||
if (membio2 == NULL) {
|
||||
|
|
|
|||
|
|
@ -285,7 +285,6 @@ static int verify_servername(SSL *client, SSL *server)
|
|||
* next_protos_parse parses a comma separated list of strings into a string
|
||||
* in a format suitable for passing to SSL_CTX_set_next_protos_advertised.
|
||||
* outlen: (output) set to the length of the resulting buffer on success.
|
||||
* err: (maybe NULL) on failure, an error message line is written to this BIO.
|
||||
* in: a NUL terminated string like "abc,def,ghi"
|
||||
*
|
||||
* returns: a malloced buffer or NULL on failure.
|
||||
|
|
@ -1758,7 +1757,7 @@ int main(int argc, char *argv[])
|
|||
goto err;
|
||||
}
|
||||
if (SSL_version(c_ssl) != version) {
|
||||
BIO_printf(bio_err, "Unxpected version negotiated. "
|
||||
BIO_printf(bio_err, "Unexpected version negotiated. "
|
||||
"Expected: %s, got %s\n", should_negotiate, SSL_get_version(c_ssl));
|
||||
ret = 1;
|
||||
goto err;
|
||||
|
|
|
|||
|
|
@ -1072,7 +1072,7 @@ sub __fixup_prg {
|
|||
# Make sure to quotify the program file on platforms that may
|
||||
# have spaces or similar in their path name.
|
||||
# To our knowledge, VMS is the exception where quotifying should
|
||||
# never happem.
|
||||
# never happen.
|
||||
($prog) = quotify($prog) unless $^O eq "VMS";
|
||||
return $prefix.$prog;
|
||||
}
|
||||
|
|
|
|||
|
|
@ -247,7 +247,7 @@ sub decrypt()
|
|||
#record layer changes yet, so it's a bit more complicated. For now
|
||||
#we will additionally check if the data length is 2 (1 byte for
|
||||
#alert level, 1 byte for alert description). If it is, then this is
|
||||
#an unecrypted alert, so don't try to decrypt
|
||||
#an unencrypted alert, so don't try to decrypt
|
||||
return $data if (length($data) == 2);
|
||||
}
|
||||
$mactaglen = 16;
|
||||
|
|
|
|||
Loading…
Reference in New Issue