replace 'unsigned const char' with 'const unsigned char'

The openssl code base has only a few occurrences of 'unsigned const char'
(15 occurrences), compared to the more common 'const unsigned char' (4420
occurrences).

While the former is not illegal C, mixing the 'const' keyword (a 'type
qualifier') in between 'unsigned' and 'char' (both 'type specifiers') is a
bit odd.

The background for writing this patch is not to be pedantic, but because
the 'opmock' program (used to mock headers for unit tests) does not accept
the 'unsigned const char' construct. While this definitely is a bug in
opmock or one of its dependencies, openssl is the only piece of software we
are using in combination with opmock that has this construct.

CLA: trivial

Reviewed-by: Nicola Tuveri <nic.tuv@gmail.com>
Reviewed-by: Matt Caswell <matt@openssl.org>
Reviewed-by: Matthias St. Pierre <Matthias.St.Pierre@ncp-e.com>
(Merged from https://github.com/openssl/openssl/pull/13722)
This commit is contained in:
Thomas De Schampheleire 2020-12-21 15:17:24 +01:00 committed by Nicola Tuveri
parent 1330093b9c
commit 6d4313f03e
5 changed files with 15 additions and 15 deletions

View File

@ -22,7 +22,7 @@
#include <openssl/md5.h>
#include <openssl/sha.h>
static unsigned const char cov_2char[64] = {
static const unsigned char cov_2char[64] = {
/* from crypto/des/fcrypt.c */
0x2E, 0x2F, 0x30, 0x31, 0x32, 0x33, 0x34, 0x35,
0x36, 0x37, 0x38, 0x39, 0x41, 0x42, 0x43, 0x44,
@ -413,7 +413,7 @@ static char *md5crypt(const char *passwd, const char *magic, const char *salt)
if (!EVP_DigestInit_ex(md2, EVP_md5(), NULL))
goto err;
if (!EVP_DigestUpdate(md2,
(i & 1) ? (unsigned const char *)passwd : buf,
(i & 1) ? (const unsigned char *)passwd : buf,
(i & 1) ? passwd_len : sizeof(buf)))
goto err;
if (i % 3) {
@ -425,7 +425,7 @@ static char *md5crypt(const char *passwd, const char *magic, const char *salt)
goto err;
}
if (!EVP_DigestUpdate(md2,
(i & 1) ? buf : (unsigned const char *)passwd,
(i & 1) ? buf : (const unsigned char *)passwd,
(i & 1) ? sizeof(buf) : passwd_len))
goto err;
if (!EVP_DigestFinal_ex(md2, buf, NULL))
@ -627,7 +627,7 @@ static char *shacrypt(const char *passwd, const char *magic, const char *salt)
n = passwd_len;
while (n) {
if (!EVP_DigestUpdate(md,
(n & 1) ? buf : (unsigned const char *)passwd,
(n & 1) ? buf : (const unsigned char *)passwd,
(n & 1) ? buf_size : passwd_len))
goto err;
n >>= 1;
@ -673,7 +673,7 @@ static char *shacrypt(const char *passwd, const char *magic, const char *salt)
if (!EVP_DigestInit_ex(md2, sha, NULL))
goto err;
if (!EVP_DigestUpdate(md2,
(n & 1) ? (unsigned const char *)p_bytes : buf,
(n & 1) ? (const unsigned char *)p_bytes : buf,
(n & 1) ? passwd_len : buf_size))
goto err;
if (n % 3) {
@ -685,7 +685,7 @@ static char *shacrypt(const char *passwd, const char *magic, const char *salt)
goto err;
}
if (!EVP_DigestUpdate(md2,
(n & 1) ? buf : (unsigned const char *)p_bytes,
(n & 1) ? buf : (const unsigned char *)p_bytes,
(n & 1) ? buf_size : passwd_len))
goto err;
if (!EVP_DigestFinal_ex(md2, buf, NULL))

View File

@ -31,7 +31,7 @@
* Added more values to handle illegal salt values the way normal crypt()
* implementations do.
*/
static unsigned const char con_salt[128] = {
static const unsigned char con_salt[128] = {
0xD2, 0xD3, 0xD4, 0xD5, 0xD6, 0xD7, 0xD8, 0xD9,
0xDA, 0xDB, 0xDC, 0xDD, 0xDE, 0xDF, 0xE0, 0xE1,
0xE2, 0xE3, 0xE4, 0xE5, 0xE6, 0xE7, 0xE8, 0xE9,
@ -50,7 +50,7 @@ static unsigned const char con_salt[128] = {
0x3D, 0x3E, 0x3F, 0x40, 0x41, 0x42, 0x43, 0x44,
};
static unsigned const char cov_2char[64] = {
static const unsigned char cov_2char[64] = {
0x2E, 0x2F, 0x30, 0x31, 0x32, 0x33, 0x34, 0x35,
0x36, 0x37, 0x38, 0x39, 0x41, 0x42, 0x43, 0x44,
0x45, 0x46, 0x47, 0x48, 0x49, 0x4A, 0x4B, 0x4C,

View File

@ -18,10 +18,10 @@ TLS client
uint8_t mtype, uint8_t ord);
int SSL_dane_enable(SSL *s, const char *basedomain);
int SSL_dane_tlsa_add(SSL *s, uint8_t usage, uint8_t selector,
uint8_t mtype, unsigned const char *data, size_t dlen);
uint8_t mtype, const unsigned char *data, size_t dlen);
int SSL_get0_dane_authority(SSL *s, X509 **mcert, EVP_PKEY **mspki);
int SSL_get0_dane_tlsa(SSL *s, uint8_t *usage, uint8_t *selector,
uint8_t *mtype, unsigned const char **data,
uint8_t *mtype, const unsigned char **data,
size_t *dlen);
unsigned long SSL_CTX_dane_set_flags(SSL_CTX *ctx, unsigned long flags);
unsigned long SSL_CTX_dane_clear_flags(SSL_CTX *ctx, unsigned long flags);

View File

@ -1810,10 +1810,10 @@ __owur int SSL_CTX_dane_mtype_set(SSL_CTX *ctx, const EVP_MD *md,
uint8_t mtype, uint8_t ord);
__owur int SSL_dane_enable(SSL *s, const char *basedomain);
__owur int SSL_dane_tlsa_add(SSL *s, uint8_t usage, uint8_t selector,
uint8_t mtype, unsigned const char *data, size_t dlen);
uint8_t mtype, const unsigned char *data, size_t dlen);
__owur int SSL_get0_dane_authority(SSL *s, X509 **mcert, EVP_PKEY **mspki);
__owur int SSL_get0_dane_tlsa(SSL *s, uint8_t *usage, uint8_t *selector,
uint8_t *mtype, unsigned const char **data,
uint8_t *mtype, const unsigned char **data,
size_t *dlen);
/*
* Bridge opacity barrier between libcrypt and libssl, also needed to support

View File

@ -269,7 +269,7 @@ static const EVP_MD *tlsa_md_get(SSL_DANE *dane, uint8_t mtype)
static int dane_tlsa_add(SSL_DANE *dane,
uint8_t usage,
uint8_t selector,
uint8_t mtype, unsigned const char *data, size_t dlen)
uint8_t mtype, const unsigned char *data, size_t dlen)
{
danetls_record *t;
const EVP_MD *md = NULL;
@ -1099,7 +1099,7 @@ int SSL_get0_dane_authority(SSL *s, X509 **mcert, EVP_PKEY **mspki)
}
int SSL_get0_dane_tlsa(SSL *s, uint8_t *usage, uint8_t *selector,
uint8_t *mtype, unsigned const char **data, size_t *dlen)
uint8_t *mtype, const unsigned char **data, size_t *dlen)
{
SSL_DANE *dane = &s->dane;
@ -1126,7 +1126,7 @@ SSL_DANE *SSL_get0_dane(SSL *s)
}
int SSL_dane_tlsa_add(SSL *s, uint8_t usage, uint8_t selector,
uint8_t mtype, unsigned const char *data, size_t dlen)
uint8_t mtype, const unsigned char *data, size_t dlen)
{
return dane_tlsa_add(&s->dane, usage, selector, mtype, data, dlen);
}