There might be warnings from AFL fuzz checker
or other warnings that we do not care about.
For success it is just required that cert_status: ocsp response sent:
is present.
Reviewed-by: Matt Caswell <matt@openssl.org>
Reviewed-by: Neil Horman <nhorman@openssl.org>
(Merged from https://github.com/openssl/openssl/pull/23851)
Also removal of duplicate assignment and addition of comment
in test/http_test.c
Follow up change to PR #23781
Reviewed-by: Matt Caswell <matt@openssl.org>
Reviewed-by: Tom Cosgrove <tom.cosgrove@arm.com>
Reviewed-by: David von Oheimb <david.von.oheimb@siemens.com>
Reviewed-by: Tomas Mraz <tomas@openssl.org>
(Merged from https://github.com/openssl/openssl/pull/23837)
Reviewed-by: Neil Horman <nhorman@openssl.org>
Reviewed-by: Tom Cosgrove <tom.cosgrove@arm.com>
Reviewed-by: Matt Caswell <matt@openssl.org>
(Merged from https://github.com/openssl/openssl/pull/23843)
In the man page for SSL_add_dir_cert_subjects_to_stack(), the functions
returning int have undocumented return values.
Fixes#23171
Signed-off-by: Shakti Shah <shaktishah33@gmail.com>
Reviewed-by: Dmitry Belyavskiy <beldmit@gmail.com>
Reviewed-by: Tomas Mraz <tomas@openssl.org>
(Merged from https://github.com/openssl/openssl/pull/23433)
Recently asan/tsan/ubsan runs have been failing randomly. It appears
that a recent runner update may have led to the Address Space Layout
Randomization setting in the linux kernel of ubuntu-latest runner
getting set to too high a value (it defaults to 30). Such a setting
leads to the possibility that a given application will have memory
mapped to an address space that the sanitizer code typically uses to do
its job. Lowering this value allows a/t/ubsan to work consistently
again
Reviewed-by: Tim Hudson <tjh@openssl.org>
Reviewed-by: Tomas Mraz <tomas@openssl.org>
(Merged from https://github.com/openssl/openssl/pull/23842)
Signed-off-by: Vladimirs Ambrosovs <rodriguez.twister@gmail.com>
Reviewed-by: Matt Caswell <matt@openssl.org>
Reviewed-by: Tomas Mraz <tomas@openssl.org>
(Merged from https://github.com/openssl/openssl/pull/23825)
tst has been already checked for invalid value in the start of the function with switch statement.
Checked again here, so removed deadcode
CLA: trivial
Reviewed-by: Tom Cosgrove <tom.cosgrove@arm.com>
Reviewed-by: Tomas Mraz <tomas@openssl.org>
(Merged from https://github.com/openssl/openssl/pull/23813)
Update the fuzz corpora submodule with the DTLS fuzz corpus.
Reviewed-by: Kurt Roeckx <kurt@roeckx.be>
Reviewed-by: Tomas Mraz <tomas@openssl.org>
(Merged from https://github.com/openssl/openssl/pull/23585)
Add a test to exercise the use of s_server with "-cert_chain" to
construct an ocsp request.
This new functionality was added in PR #22192.
Testing:
make V=1 TESTS='test_ocsp_cert_chain' test
Reviewed-by: Matt Caswell <matt@openssl.org>
Reviewed-by: Tomas Mraz <tomas@openssl.org>
(Merged from https://github.com/openssl/openssl/pull/23101)
Change introduces a default limit on HTTP headers we expect to receive
from server to 256. If limit is exceeded http client library indicates
HTTP_R_RESPONSE_TOO_MANY_HDRLINES error. Application can use
OSSL_HTTP_REQ_CTX_set_max_response_hdr_lines() to change default.
Setting limit to 0 implies no limit (current behavior).
Fixes#22264
Reviewed-by: Matt Caswell <matt@openssl.org>
Reviewed-by: Tomas Mraz <tomas@openssl.org>
(Merged from https://github.com/openssl/openssl/pull/23781)
Add check for the return value of xor_get_aid() in order to avoid NULL pointer deference.
For example, "algor" could be NULL if the allocation of X509_ALGOR_new() fails. As a result, i2d_X509_ALGOR() will return 0 and "ctx->aid" will be an invalid value NULL.
Fixes: f4ed6eed2c ("SSL_set1_groups_list(): Fix memory corruption with 40 groups and more")
Signed-off-by: Jiasheng Jiang <jiasheng@purdue.edu>
Reviewed-by: Tom Cosgrove <tom.cosgrove@arm.com>
Reviewed-by: Tomas Mraz <tomas@openssl.org>
(Merged from https://github.com/openssl/openssl/pull/23764)
CLA: trivial
Reviewed-by: Tomas Mraz <tomas@openssl.org>
Reviewed-by: Matt Caswell <matt@openssl.org>
Reviewed-by: Richard Levitte <levitte@openssl.org>
(Merged from https://github.com/openssl/openssl/pull/23805)
There are two consecutive identical checks "if (i <= 0)".
We can remove one of them to make the code clear.
CLA: trivial
Signed-off-by: Jiasheng Jiang <jiasheng@purdue.edu>
Reviewed-by: Tom Cosgrove <tom.cosgrove@arm.com>
Reviewed-by: Matt Caswell <matt@openssl.org>
Reviewed-by: Tomas Mraz <tomas@openssl.org>
(Merged from https://github.com/openssl/openssl/pull/23741)
times.
Fixes#23672
There are many name/value pairs currently that have duplicate names e.g.
'CAPABILITY_TLS_GROUP_MAX_TLS' => "tls-max-tls",
'CAPABILITY_TLS_SIGALG_MAX_TLS' => "tls-max-tls",
Stripping the .pm file down to just the above entries and running
multiple times gives different results for the produce_decoder.
On multiple runs any iterations over the unordered hash table keys using
foreach my $name (keys %params) results in a different order on multiple
runs. Because of this the mapping from the hash 'value' back to the
'key' will be different.
Note that the code also uses another mechanism in places that uses
"name1" => "value"
"name2" => "*name1"
Rather than fix all the strings the change done was to sort the keys. If
we were to chose to fix the strings then the perl code should be changed
to detect duplicates.
Reviewed-by: Paul Dale <ppzgs1@gmail.com>
Reviewed-by: Tomas Mraz <tomas@openssl.org>
Reviewed-by: Richard Levitte <levitte@openssl.org>
Reviewed-by: Tom Cosgrove <tom.cosgrove@arm.com>
(Merged from https://github.com/openssl/openssl/pull/23688)
the page the link refers to does not exist.
Anyone objects to delete file?
Reviewed-by: Tomas Mraz <tomas@openssl.org>
Reviewed-by: Matt Caswell <matt@openssl.org>
(Merged from https://github.com/openssl/openssl/pull/23719)
Fixes#23655
BIO_get_new_index() returns a range of 129..255.
It is set to BIO_TYPE_START (128) initially and is incremented on each
call.
>= 256 is reserved for the class type flags (BIO_TYPE_DESCRIPTOR) so it
should error if it reaches the upper bound.
Reviewed-by: Hugo Landau <hlandau@openssl.org>
Reviewed-by: Tomas Mraz <tomas@openssl.org>
(Merged from https://github.com/openssl/openssl/pull/23732)
docs say the SSL object in this function is const, but the api doesn't
qualify it as such. Adjust the docs to match the definition
Reviewed-by: Ben Kaduk <kaduk@mit.edu>
Reviewed-by: Tim Hudson <tjh@openssl.org>
(Merged from https://github.com/openssl/openssl/pull/23785)
Reviewed-by: Matt Caswell <matt@openssl.org>
Reviewed-by: Neil Horman <nhorman@openssl.org>
Reviewed-by: Tom Cosgrove <tom.cosgrove@arm.com>
(Merged from https://github.com/openssl/openssl/pull/23705)
some variants of FreeBSD (notably Dells OneFS) implement IP_PKTINFO
partially, and as such the build breaks for those variants.
specifically, it supports IP_PKTINFO, but the in_pktinfo struct has no
defined ipi_spec_dst field. Work around this by gating the setting of
that variable on not building for FreeBSD
Fixes#23739
Reviewed-by: Hugo Landau <hlandau@openssl.org>
Reviewed-by: Tim Hudson <tjh@openssl.org>
(Merged from https://github.com/openssl/openssl/pull/23753)
Imitating Fedora 39 configuration in openssl.cnf with
SECLEVEL lowered to 0 in order to be able to run
TLS 1.3 tests with TLS_AES_128_CCM_8_SHA256.
In order to make updating smoother, check out specific tag rather
than the branch. This way, "old" tests can be fetched until PR
pointing to "new" tests is merged, so backwards-incompatible
changes can be done when needed.
Files specific for openssl upstream moved to separate
directory.
CLA: trivial
Reviewed-by: Dmitry Belyavskiy <beldmit@gmail.com>
Reviewed-by: Neil Horman <nhorman@openssl.org>
(Merged from https://github.com/openssl/openssl/pull/23747)
Related to #20789
Signature algorithms and groups in the configuration that are
preceded with ? character and are unknown to libssl are just ignored.
The handling for them is similar to handling of ciphers.
I.e., there should be a failure only in case the configuration produces
no valid sigalgs or groups.
Also ignore duplicate sigalgs and groups as such confiuration errors
should not be fatal.
Reviewed-by: Nicola Tuveri <nic.tuv@gmail.com>
Reviewed-by: Dmitry Belyavskiy <beldmit@gmail.com>
(Merged from https://github.com/openssl/openssl/pull/23050)
Reviewed-by: Tomas Mraz <tomas@openssl.org>
Reviewed-by: Dmitry Belyavskiy <beldmit@gmail.com>
Reviewed-by: David von Oheimb <david.von.oheimb@siemens.com>
(Merged from https://github.com/openssl/openssl/pull/21660)
Reviewed-by: Tomas Mraz <tomas@openssl.org>
Reviewed-by: Dmitry Belyavskiy <beldmit@gmail.com>
Reviewed-by: David von Oheimb <david.von.oheimb@siemens.com>
(Merged from https://github.com/openssl/openssl/pull/21660)
Reviewed-by: Tomas Mraz <tomas@openssl.org>
Reviewed-by: Dmitry Belyavskiy <beldmit@gmail.com>
Reviewed-by: David von Oheimb <david.von.oheimb@siemens.com>
(Merged from https://github.com/openssl/openssl/pull/21660)
Tomas Mraz
Alexandr Nedvedicky
Shakti Shah
Job Snijders
Neil Horman
Frederik Wedel-Heinen
Vladimirs Ambrosovs
Joachim Vandersmissen
sharad3001
James Muir
Jiasheng Jiang
olszomal
谭九鼎
Aarni Koskela
slontis
Hugo Landau
Bernd Edlinger
Stanislav Zidek
Dmitry Belyavskiy
Dr. David von Oheimb