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rustls/rustls/src/client/tls13.rs

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use crate::msgs::enums::{ContentType, HandshakeType, ExtensionType, SignatureScheme};
use crate::msgs::enums::{ProtocolVersion, AlertDescription, NamedGroup};
use crate::msgs::message::{Message, MessagePayload};
use crate::msgs::base::{Payload, PayloadU8};
use crate::msgs::handshake::{HandshakePayload, HandshakeMessagePayload};
use crate::msgs::handshake::{SessionID, ServerHelloPayload, HasServerExtensions};
use crate::msgs::handshake::{ClientExtension, HelloRetryRequest, KeyShareEntry};
use crate::msgs::handshake::EncryptedExtensions;
use crate::msgs::handshake::{CertificatePayloadTLS13, CertificateEntry};
use crate::msgs::handshake::{PresharedKeyIdentity, PresharedKeyOffer};
use crate::msgs::handshake::DigitallySignedStruct;
use crate::msgs::ccs::ChangeCipherSpecPayload;
use crate::msgs::codec::Codec;
use crate::msgs::persist;
use crate::client::ClientSessionImpl;
use crate::key_schedule::{SecretKind, KeySchedule};
use crate::cipher;
use crate::hash_hs;
use crate::verify;
use crate::sign;
use crate::suites;
use crate::ticketer;
#[cfg(feature = "logging")]
use crate::log::{debug, warn};
use crate::error::TLSError;
use crate::handshake::{check_message, check_handshake_message};
#[cfg(feature = "quic")]
use crate::{
quic,
msgs::base::PayloadU16,
session::Protocol
};
use crate::client::common::{ServerCertDetails, HandshakeDetails};
use crate::client::common::{ClientHelloDetails, ClientAuthDetails};
use crate::client::hs;
use ring::constant_time;
use webpki;
// Extensions we expect in plaintext in the ServerHello.
static ALLOWED_PLAINTEXT_EXTS: &'static [ExtensionType] = &[
ExtensionType::KeyShare,
ExtensionType::PreSharedKey,
ExtensionType::SupportedVersions,
];
// Only the intersection of things we offer, and those disallowed
// in TLS1.3
static DISALLOWED_TLS13_EXTS: &'static [ExtensionType] = &[
ExtensionType::ECPointFormats,
ExtensionType::SessionTicket,
ExtensionType::RenegotiationInfo,
ExtensionType::ExtendedMasterSecret,
];
pub fn validate_server_hello(sess: &mut ClientSessionImpl,
server_hello: &ServerHelloPayload) -> Result<(), TLSError> {
for ext in &server_hello.extensions {
if !ALLOWED_PLAINTEXT_EXTS.contains(&ext.get_type()) {
sess.common.send_fatal_alert(AlertDescription::UnsupportedExtension);
return Err(TLSError::PeerMisbehavedError("server sent unexpected cleartext ext"
.to_string()));
}
}
Ok(())
}
fn find_kx_hint(sess: &mut ClientSessionImpl, dns_name: webpki::DNSNameRef) -> Option<NamedGroup> {
let key = persist::ClientSessionKey::hint_for_dns_name(dns_name);
let key_buf = key.get_encoding();
let maybe_value = sess.config.session_persistence.get(&key_buf);
maybe_value.and_then(|enc| NamedGroup::read_bytes(&enc))
}
fn save_kx_hint(sess: &mut ClientSessionImpl, dns_name: webpki::DNSNameRef, group: NamedGroup) {
let key = persist::ClientSessionKey::hint_for_dns_name(dns_name);
sess.config.session_persistence.put(key.get_encoding(), group.get_encoding());
}
pub fn choose_kx_groups(sess: &mut ClientSessionImpl,
exts: &mut Vec<ClientExtension>,
hello: &mut ClientHelloDetails,
handshake: &mut HandshakeDetails,
retryreq: Option<&HelloRetryRequest>) {
// Choose our groups:
// - if we've been asked via HelloRetryRequest for a specific
// one, do that.
// - if not, we might have a hint of what the server supports
// - if not, send just X25519.
//
let groups = retryreq.and_then(HelloRetryRequest::get_requested_key_share_group)
.or_else(|| find_kx_hint(sess, handshake.dns_name.as_ref()))
.or_else(|| Some(NamedGroup::X25519))
.map(|grp| vec![ grp ])
.unwrap();
let mut key_shares = vec![];
for group in groups {
// in reply to HelloRetryRequest, we must not alter any existing key
// shares
if let Some(already_offered_share) = hello.find_key_share(group) {
key_shares.push(KeyShareEntry::new(group, already_offered_share.pubkey.as_ref()));
hello.offered_key_shares.push(already_offered_share);
continue;
}
if let Some(key_share) = suites::KeyExchange::start_ecdhe(group) {
key_shares.push(KeyShareEntry::new(group, key_share.pubkey.as_ref()));
hello.offered_key_shares.push(key_share);
}
}
exts.push(ClientExtension::KeyShare(key_shares));
}
/// This implements the horrifying TLS1.3 hack where PSK binders have a
/// data dependency on the message they are contained within.
pub fn fill_in_psk_binder(sess: &mut ClientSessionImpl,
handshake: &mut HandshakeDetails,
hmp: &mut HandshakeMessagePayload) {
// We need to know the hash function of the suite we're trying to resume into.
let resuming = handshake.resuming_session.as_ref().unwrap();
let suite = sess.find_cipher_suite(resuming.cipher_suite).unwrap();
let hkdf_alg = suite.hkdf_algorithm;
let suite_hash = suite.get_hash();
// The binder is calculated over the clienthello, but doesn't include itself or its
// length, or the length of its container.
let binder_plaintext = hmp.get_encoding_for_binder_signing();
let handshake_hash =
handshake.transcript.get_hash_given(suite_hash, &binder_plaintext);
let mut empty_hash_ctx = hash_hs::HandshakeHash::new();
empty_hash_ctx.start_hash(suite_hash);
let empty_hash = empty_hash_ctx.get_current_hash();
// Run a fake key_schedule to simulate what the server will do if it choses
// to resume.
let key_schedule = KeySchedule::new(hkdf_alg, &resuming.master_secret.0);
let base_key = key_schedule.derive(hkdf_alg, SecretKind::ResumptionPSKBinderKey, &empty_hash);
let real_binder = key_schedule.sign_verify_data(&base_key, &handshake_hash);
if let HandshakePayload::ClientHello(ref mut ch) = hmp.payload {
ch.set_psk_binder(real_binder);
};
sess.common.set_key_schedule(key_schedule);
}
pub fn start_handshake_traffic(sess: &mut ClientSessionImpl,
server_hello: &ServerHelloPayload,
handshake: &mut HandshakeDetails,
hello: &mut ClientHelloDetails)
-> Result<(), TLSError> {
let suite = sess.common.get_suite_assert();
if let Some(selected_psk) = server_hello.get_psk_index() {
if let Some(ref resuming) = handshake.resuming_session {
let resume_from_suite = sess.find_cipher_suite(resuming.cipher_suite).unwrap();
if !resume_from_suite.can_resume_to(suite) {
return Err(TLSError::PeerMisbehavedError("server resuming incompatible suite"
.to_string()));
}
if selected_psk != 0 {
return Err(TLSError::PeerMisbehavedError("server selected invalid psk"
.to_string()));
}
debug!("Resuming using PSK");
// The key schedule has been initialized and set in fill_in_psk()
// Server must be using the resumption suite, otherwise set_suite()
// in ExpectServerHello::handle() would fail.
// key_schedule.input_secret(&resuming.master_secret.0);
} else {
return Err(TLSError::PeerMisbehavedError("server selected unoffered psk".to_string()));
}
} else {
debug!("Not resuming");
// Discard the early data key schedule.
sess.early_data.rejected();
sess.common.early_traffic = false;
sess.common.set_key_schedule(KeySchedule::new_with_empty_secret(suite.hkdf_algorithm));
handshake.resuming_session.take();
}
let their_key_share = server_hello.get_key_share()
.ok_or_else(|| {
sess.common.send_fatal_alert(AlertDescription::MissingExtension);
TLSError::PeerMisbehavedError("missing key share".to_string())
})?;
let our_key_share = hello.find_key_share_and_discard_others(their_key_share.group)
.ok_or_else(|| hs::illegal_param(sess, "wrong group for key share"))?;
let shared = our_key_share.complete(&their_key_share.payload.0)
.ok_or_else(|| TLSError::PeerMisbehavedError("key exchange failed"
.to_string()))?;
save_kx_hint(sess, handshake.dns_name.as_ref(), their_key_share.group);
sess.common.get_mut_key_schedule().input_secret(&shared.premaster_secret);
hs::check_aligned_handshake(sess)?;
handshake.hash_at_client_recvd_server_hello =
handshake.transcript.get_current_hash();
if !sess.early_data.is_enabled() {
// Set the client encryption key for handshakes if early data is not used
let write_key = sess.common.get_key_schedule()
.derive_logged_secret(SecretKind::ClientHandshakeTrafficSecret,
&handshake.hash_at_client_recvd_server_hello,
&*sess.config.key_log,
&handshake.randoms.client);
sess.common.set_message_encrypter(cipher::new_tls13_write(suite, &write_key));
sess.common.get_mut_key_schedule().current_client_traffic_secret = Some(write_key);
}
let read_key = sess.common.get_key_schedule()
.derive_logged_secret(SecretKind::ServerHandshakeTrafficSecret,
&handshake.hash_at_client_recvd_server_hello,
&*sess.config.key_log,
&handshake.randoms.client);
sess.common.set_message_decrypter(cipher::new_tls13_read(suite, &read_key));
sess.common.get_mut_key_schedule().current_server_traffic_secret = Some(read_key);
#[cfg(feature = "quic")] {
let key_schedule = sess.common.key_schedule.as_ref().unwrap();
let client = if sess.early_data.is_enabled() {
// Traffic secret wasn't computed and stored above, so do it here.
sess.common.get_key_schedule().derive(
sess.common.get_key_schedule().algorithm(),
SecretKind::ClientHandshakeTrafficSecret,
&handshake.hash_at_client_recvd_server_hello)
} else {
key_schedule.current_client_traffic_secret.clone().unwrap()
};
sess.common.quic.hs_secrets = Some(quic::Secrets {
client,
server: key_schedule.current_server_traffic_secret.clone().unwrap(),
});
}
Ok(())
}
pub fn prepare_resumption(sess: &mut ClientSessionImpl,
ticket: Vec<u8>,
handshake: &HandshakeDetails,
exts: &mut Vec<ClientExtension>,
doing_retry: bool) -> bool {
let resuming_suite = handshake.resuming_session
.as_ref()
.and_then(|resume| sess.find_cipher_suite(resume.cipher_suite));
if hs::compatible_suite(sess, resuming_suite) {
sess.resumption_ciphersuite = resuming_suite;
// The EarlyData extension MUST be supplied together with the
// PreSharedKey extension.
let max_early_data_size = handshake
.resuming_session
.as_ref()
.map_or(0, |resume| resume.max_early_data_size);
if sess.config.enable_early_data && max_early_data_size > 0 && !doing_retry {
sess.early_data.enable(max_early_data_size as usize);
exts.push(ClientExtension::EarlyData);
}
// Finally, and only for TLS1.3 with a ticket resumption, include a binder
// for our ticket. This must go last.
//
// Include an empty binder. It gets filled in below because it depends on
// the message it's contained in (!!!).
let (obfuscated_ticket_age, suite) = {
let resuming = handshake.resuming_session
.as_ref()
.unwrap();
(resuming.get_obfuscated_ticket_age(ticketer::timebase()), resuming.cipher_suite)
};
let binder_len = sess.find_cipher_suite(suite).unwrap().get_hash().output_len;
let binder = vec![0u8; binder_len];
let psk_identity = PresharedKeyIdentity::new(ticket, obfuscated_ticket_age);
let psk_ext = PresharedKeyOffer::new(psk_identity, binder);
exts.push(ClientExtension::PresharedKey(psk_ext));
true
} else {
false
}
}
pub fn emit_fake_ccs(hs: &mut HandshakeDetails, sess: &mut ClientSessionImpl) {
#[cfg(feature = "quic")] {
if let Protocol::Quic = sess.common.protocol { return; }
}
if hs.sent_tls13_fake_ccs {
return;
}
let m = Message {
typ: ContentType::ChangeCipherSpec,
version: ProtocolVersion::TLSv1_2,
payload: MessagePayload::ChangeCipherSpec(ChangeCipherSpecPayload {})
};
sess.common.send_msg(m, false);
hs.sent_tls13_fake_ccs = true;
}
fn validate_encrypted_extensions(sess: &mut ClientSessionImpl,
hello: &ClientHelloDetails,
exts: &EncryptedExtensions) -> Result<(), TLSError> {
if exts.has_duplicate_extension() {
sess.common.send_fatal_alert(AlertDescription::DecodeError);
return Err(TLSError::PeerMisbehavedError("server sent duplicate encrypted extensions"
.to_string()));
}
if hello.server_sent_unsolicited_extensions(exts, &[]) {
sess.common.send_fatal_alert(AlertDescription::UnsupportedExtension);
let msg = "server sent unsolicited encrypted extension".to_string();
return Err(TLSError::PeerMisbehavedError(msg));
}
for ext in exts {
if ALLOWED_PLAINTEXT_EXTS.contains(&ext.get_type()) ||
DISALLOWED_TLS13_EXTS.contains(&ext.get_type()) {
sess.common.send_fatal_alert(AlertDescription::UnsupportedExtension);
let msg = "server sent inappropriate encrypted extension".to_string();
return Err(TLSError::PeerMisbehavedError(msg));
}
}
Ok(())
}
pub struct ExpectEncryptedExtensions {
pub handshake: HandshakeDetails,
pub server_cert: ServerCertDetails,
pub hello: ClientHelloDetails,
}
impl ExpectEncryptedExtensions {
fn into_expect_finished_resume(self,
certv: verify::ServerCertVerified,
sigv: verify::HandshakeSignatureValid) -> hs::NextState {
Box::new(ExpectFinished {
handshake: self.handshake,
client_auth: None,
cert_verified: certv,
sig_verified: sigv,
})
}
fn into_expect_certificate_or_certreq(self) -> hs::NextState {
Box::new(ExpectCertificateOrCertReq {
handshake: self.handshake,
server_cert: self.server_cert,
})
}
}
impl hs::State for ExpectEncryptedExtensions {
fn check_message(&self, m: &Message) -> Result<(), TLSError> {
check_handshake_message(m, &[HandshakeType::EncryptedExtensions])
}
fn handle(mut self: Box<Self>, sess: &mut ClientSessionImpl, m: Message) -> hs::NextStateOrError {
let exts = extract_handshake!(m, HandshakePayload::EncryptedExtensions).unwrap();
debug!("TLS1.3 encrypted extensions: {:?}", exts);
self.handshake.transcript.add_message(&m);
validate_encrypted_extensions(sess, &self.hello, exts)?;
hs::process_alpn_protocol(sess, exts.get_alpn_protocol())?;
#[cfg(feature = "quic")] {
// QUIC transport parameters
if let Some(params) = exts.get_quic_params_extension() {
sess.common.quic.params = Some(params);
}
}
if self.handshake.resuming_session.is_some() {
let was_early_traffic = sess.common.early_traffic;
if was_early_traffic {
if exts.early_data_extension_offered() {
sess.early_data.accepted();
} else {
sess.early_data.rejected();
sess.common.early_traffic = false;
}
}
if was_early_traffic && !sess.common.early_traffic {
// If no early traffic, set the encryption key for handshakes
let suite = sess.common.get_suite_assert();
let write_key = sess.common.get_key_schedule()
.derive_logged_secret(
SecretKind::ClientHandshakeTrafficSecret,
&self.handshake.hash_at_client_recvd_server_hello,
&*sess.config.key_log,
&self.handshake.randoms.client);
sess.common.set_message_encrypter(cipher::new_tls13_write(suite, &write_key));
sess.common.get_mut_key_schedule()
.current_client_traffic_secret = Some(write_key);
}
let certv = verify::ServerCertVerified::assertion();
let sigv = verify::HandshakeSignatureValid::assertion();
Ok(self.into_expect_finished_resume(certv, sigv))
} else {
if exts.early_data_extension_offered() {
let msg = "server sent early data extension without resumption".to_string();
return Err(TLSError::PeerMisbehavedError(msg));
}
Ok(self.into_expect_certificate_or_certreq())
}
}
}
struct ExpectCertificate {
handshake: HandshakeDetails,
server_cert: ServerCertDetails,
client_auth: Option<ClientAuthDetails>,
}
impl ExpectCertificate {
fn into_expect_certificate_verify(self) -> hs::NextState {
Box::new(ExpectCertificateVerify {
handshake: self.handshake,
server_cert: self.server_cert,
client_auth: self.client_auth,
})
}
}
impl hs::State for ExpectCertificate {
fn check_message(&self, m: &Message) -> Result<(), TLSError> {
check_handshake_message(m, &[HandshakeType::Certificate])
}
fn handle(mut self: Box<Self>, sess: &mut ClientSessionImpl, m: Message) -> hs::NextStateOrError {
let cert_chain = extract_handshake!(m, HandshakePayload::CertificateTLS13).unwrap();
self.handshake.transcript.add_message(&m);
// This is only non-empty for client auth.
if !cert_chain.context.0.is_empty() {
warn!("certificate with non-empty context during handshake");
sess.common.send_fatal_alert(AlertDescription::DecodeError);
return Err(TLSError::CorruptMessagePayload(ContentType::Handshake));
}
if cert_chain.any_entry_has_duplicate_extension() ||
cert_chain.any_entry_has_unknown_extension() {
warn!("certificate chain contains unsolicited/unknown extension");
sess.common.send_fatal_alert(AlertDescription::UnsupportedExtension);
return Err(TLSError::PeerMisbehavedError("bad cert chain extensions".to_string()));
}
self.server_cert.ocsp_response = cert_chain.get_end_entity_ocsp();
self.server_cert.scts = cert_chain.get_end_entity_scts();
self.server_cert.cert_chain = cert_chain.convert();
if let Some(sct_list) = self.server_cert.scts.as_ref() {
if hs::sct_list_is_invalid(sct_list) {
let error_msg = "server sent invalid SCT list".to_string();
return Err(TLSError::PeerMisbehavedError(error_msg));
}
if sess.config.ct_logs.is_none() {
let error_msg = "server sent unsolicited SCT list".to_string();
return Err(TLSError::PeerMisbehavedError(error_msg));
}
}
Ok(self.into_expect_certificate_verify())
}
}
struct ExpectCertificateOrCertReq {
handshake: HandshakeDetails,
server_cert: ServerCertDetails,
}
impl ExpectCertificateOrCertReq {
fn into_expect_certificate(self) -> hs::NextState {
Box::new(ExpectCertificate {
handshake: self.handshake,
server_cert: self.server_cert,
client_auth: None,
})
}
fn into_expect_certificate_req(self) -> hs::NextState {
Box::new(ExpectCertificateRequest {
handshake: self.handshake,
server_cert: self.server_cert,
})
}
}
impl hs::State for ExpectCertificateOrCertReq {
fn check_message(&self, m: &Message) -> Result<(), TLSError> {
check_handshake_message(m,
&[HandshakeType::Certificate,
HandshakeType::CertificateRequest])
}
fn handle(self: Box<Self>, sess: &mut ClientSessionImpl, m: Message) -> hs::NextStateOrError {
if m.is_handshake_type(HandshakeType::Certificate) {
self.into_expect_certificate().handle(sess, m)
} else {
self.into_expect_certificate_req().handle(sess, m)
}
}
}
// --- TLS1.3 CertificateVerify ---
struct ExpectCertificateVerify {
handshake: HandshakeDetails,
server_cert: ServerCertDetails,
client_auth: Option<ClientAuthDetails>,
}
impl ExpectCertificateVerify {
fn into_expect_finished(self,
certv: verify::ServerCertVerified,
sigv: verify::HandshakeSignatureValid) -> hs::NextState {
Box::new(ExpectFinished {
handshake: self.handshake,
client_auth: self.client_auth,
cert_verified: certv,
sig_verified: sigv,
})
}
}
fn send_cert_error_alert(sess: &mut ClientSessionImpl, err: TLSError) -> TLSError {
match err {
TLSError::WebPKIError(webpki::Error::BadDER) => {
sess.common.send_fatal_alert(AlertDescription::DecodeError);
}
TLSError::PeerMisbehavedError(_) => {
sess.common.send_fatal_alert(AlertDescription::IllegalParameter);
}
_ => {
sess.common.send_fatal_alert(AlertDescription::BadCertificate);
}
};
err
}
impl hs::State for ExpectCertificateVerify {
fn check_message(&self, m: &Message) -> Result<(), TLSError> {
check_handshake_message(m, &[HandshakeType::CertificateVerify])
}
fn handle(mut self: Box<Self>, sess: &mut ClientSessionImpl, m: Message) -> hs::NextStateOrError {
let cert_verify = extract_handshake!(m, HandshakePayload::CertificateVerify).unwrap();
debug!("Server cert is {:?}", self.server_cert.cert_chain);
// 1. Verify the certificate chain.
if self.server_cert.cert_chain.is_empty() {
return Err(TLSError::NoCertificatesPresented);
}
let certv = sess.config
.get_verifier()
.verify_server_cert(&sess.config.root_store,
&self.server_cert.cert_chain,
self.handshake.dns_name.as_ref(),
&self.server_cert.ocsp_response)
.map_err(|err| send_cert_error_alert(sess, err))?;
// 2. Verify their signature on the handshake.
let handshake_hash = self.handshake.transcript.get_current_hash();
let sigv = verify::verify_tls13(&self.server_cert.cert_chain[0],
cert_verify,
&handshake_hash,
b"TLS 1.3, server CertificateVerify\x00")
.map_err(|err| send_cert_error_alert(sess, err))?;
// 3. Verify any included SCTs.
match (self.server_cert.scts.as_ref(), sess.config.ct_logs) {
(Some(scts), Some(logs)) => {
verify::verify_scts(&self.server_cert.cert_chain[0],
scts,
logs)?;
}
(_, _) => {}
}
sess.server_cert_chain = self.server_cert.take_chain();
self.handshake.transcript.add_message(&m);
Ok(self.into_expect_finished(certv, sigv))
}
}
// TLS1.3 version of CertificateRequest handling. We then move to expecting the server
// Certificate. Unfortunately the CertificateRequest type changed in an annoying way
// in TLS1.3.
struct ExpectCertificateRequest {
handshake: HandshakeDetails,
server_cert: ServerCertDetails,
}
impl ExpectCertificateRequest {
fn into_expect_certificate(self, client_auth: ClientAuthDetails) -> hs::NextState {
Box::new(ExpectCertificate {
handshake: self.handshake,
server_cert: self.server_cert,
client_auth: Some(client_auth),
})
}
}
impl hs::State for ExpectCertificateRequest {
fn check_message(&self, m: &Message) -> Result<(), TLSError> {
check_handshake_message(m, &[HandshakeType::CertificateRequest])
}
fn handle(mut self: Box<Self>, sess: &mut ClientSessionImpl, m: Message) -> hs::NextStateOrError {
let certreq = &extract_handshake!(m, HandshakePayload::CertificateRequestTLS13).unwrap();
self.handshake.transcript.add_message(&m);
debug!("Got CertificateRequest {:?}", certreq);
// Fortunately the problems here in TLS1.2 and prior are corrected in
// TLS1.3.
// Must be empty during handshake.
if !certreq.context.0.is_empty() {
warn!("Server sent non-empty certreq context");
sess.common.send_fatal_alert(AlertDescription::DecodeError);
return Err(TLSError::CorruptMessagePayload(ContentType::Handshake));
}
let tls13_sign_schemes = sign::supported_sign_tls13();
let no_sigschemes = Vec::new();
let compat_sigschemes = certreq.get_sigalgs_extension()
.unwrap_or(&no_sigschemes)
.iter()
.cloned()
.filter(|scheme| tls13_sign_schemes.contains(scheme))
.collect::<Vec<SignatureScheme>>();
if compat_sigschemes.is_empty() {
sess.common.send_fatal_alert(AlertDescription::HandshakeFailure);
return Err(TLSError::PeerIncompatibleError("server sent bad certreq schemes".to_string()));
}
let no_canames = Vec::new();
let canames = certreq.get_authorities_extension()
.unwrap_or(&no_canames)
.iter()
.map(|p| p.0.as_slice())
.collect::<Vec<&[u8]>>();
let maybe_certkey =
sess.config.client_auth_cert_resolver.resolve(&canames, &compat_sigschemes);
let mut client_auth = ClientAuthDetails::new();
if let Some(mut certkey) = maybe_certkey {
debug!("Attempting client auth");
let maybe_signer = certkey.key.choose_scheme(&compat_sigschemes);
client_auth.cert = Some(certkey.take_cert());
client_auth.signer = maybe_signer;
client_auth.auth_context = Some(certreq.context.0.clone());
} else {
debug!("Client auth requested but no cert selected");
}
Ok(self.into_expect_certificate(client_auth))
}
}
fn emit_certificate_tls13(handshake: &mut HandshakeDetails,
client_auth: &mut ClientAuthDetails,
sess: &mut ClientSessionImpl) {
let context = client_auth.auth_context
.take()
.unwrap_or_else(Vec::new);
let mut cert_payload = CertificatePayloadTLS13 {
context: PayloadU8::new(context),
entries: Vec::new(),
};
if let Some(cert_chain) = client_auth.cert.take() {
for cert in cert_chain {
cert_payload.entries.push(CertificateEntry::new(cert));
}
}
let m = Message {
typ: ContentType::Handshake,
version: ProtocolVersion::TLSv1_3,
payload: MessagePayload::Handshake(HandshakeMessagePayload {
typ: HandshakeType::Certificate,
payload: HandshakePayload::CertificateTLS13(cert_payload),
}),
};
handshake.transcript.add_message(&m);
sess.common.send_msg(m, true);
}
fn emit_certverify_tls13(handshake: &mut HandshakeDetails,
client_auth: &mut ClientAuthDetails,
sess: &mut ClientSessionImpl) -> Result<(), TLSError> {
if client_auth.signer.is_none() {
debug!("Skipping certverify message (no client scheme/key)");
return Ok(());
}
let mut message = Vec::new();
message.resize(64, 0x20u8);
message.extend_from_slice(b"TLS 1.3, client CertificateVerify\x00");
message.extend_from_slice(&handshake.transcript.get_current_hash());
let signer = client_auth.signer.take().unwrap();
let scheme = signer.get_scheme();
let sig = signer.sign(&message)?;
let dss = DigitallySignedStruct::new(scheme, sig);
let m = Message {
typ: ContentType::Handshake,
version: ProtocolVersion::TLSv1_3,
payload: MessagePayload::Handshake(HandshakeMessagePayload {
typ: HandshakeType::CertificateVerify,
payload: HandshakePayload::CertificateVerify(dss),
}),
};
handshake.transcript.add_message(&m);
sess.common.send_msg(m, true);
Ok(())
}
fn emit_finished_tls13(handshake: &mut HandshakeDetails,
sess: &mut ClientSessionImpl) {
let handshake_hash = handshake.transcript.get_current_hash();
let verify_data = sess.common
.get_key_schedule()
.sign_finish(SecretKind::ClientHandshakeTrafficSecret, &handshake_hash);
let verify_data_payload = Payload::new(verify_data);
let m = Message {
typ: ContentType::Handshake,
version: ProtocolVersion::TLSv1_3,
payload: MessagePayload::Handshake(HandshakeMessagePayload {
typ: HandshakeType::Finished,
payload: HandshakePayload::Finished(verify_data_payload),
}),
};
handshake.transcript.add_message(&m);
sess.common.send_msg(m, true);
}
fn emit_end_of_early_data_tls13(handshake: &mut HandshakeDetails,
sess: &mut ClientSessionImpl) {
#[cfg(feature = "quic")]
{
if let Protocol::Quic = sess.common.protocol { return; }
}
let m = Message {
typ: ContentType::Handshake,
version: ProtocolVersion::TLSv1_3,
payload: MessagePayload::Handshake(HandshakeMessagePayload {
typ: HandshakeType::EndOfEarlyData,
payload: HandshakePayload::EndOfEarlyData,
}),
};
handshake.transcript.add_message(&m);
sess.common.send_msg(m, true);
}
struct ExpectFinished {
handshake: HandshakeDetails,
client_auth: Option<ClientAuthDetails>,
cert_verified: verify::ServerCertVerified,
sig_verified: verify::HandshakeSignatureValid,
}
impl ExpectFinished {
fn into_expect_traffic(self,
fin: verify::FinishedMessageVerified) -> ExpectTraffic {
ExpectTraffic {
handshake: self.handshake,
_cert_verified: self.cert_verified,
_sig_verified: self.sig_verified,
_fin_verified: fin,
}
}
}
impl hs::State for ExpectFinished {
fn check_message(&self, m: &Message) -> hs::CheckResult {
check_handshake_message(m, &[HandshakeType::Finished])
}
fn handle(self: Box<Self>, sess: &mut ClientSessionImpl, m: Message) -> hs::NextStateOrError {
let mut st = *self;
let finished = extract_handshake!(m, HandshakePayload::Finished).unwrap();
let handshake_hash = st.handshake.transcript.get_current_hash();
let expect_verify_data = sess.common
.get_key_schedule()
.sign_finish(SecretKind::ServerHandshakeTrafficSecret, &handshake_hash);
let fin = constant_time::verify_slices_are_equal(&expect_verify_data, &finished.0)
.map_err(|_| {
sess.common.send_fatal_alert(AlertDescription::DecryptError);
TLSError::DecryptError
})
.map(|_| verify::FinishedMessageVerified::assertion())?;
let suite = sess.common.get_suite_assert();
let maybe_write_key = if sess.common.early_traffic {
/* Derive the client-to-server encryption key before key schedule update */
let key = sess.common
.get_key_schedule()
.derive_logged_secret(
SecretKind::ClientHandshakeTrafficSecret,
&st.handshake.hash_at_client_recvd_server_hello,
&*sess.config.key_log,
&st.handshake.randoms.client);
Some(key)
} else {
None
};
st.handshake.transcript.add_message(&m);
/* Transition to application data */
sess.common.get_mut_key_schedule().input_empty();
/* Traffic from server is now decrypted with application data keys. */
let handshake_hash = st.handshake.transcript.get_current_hash();
let read_key = sess.common
.get_key_schedule()
.derive_logged_secret(
SecretKind::ServerApplicationTrafficSecret,
&handshake_hash,
&*sess.config.key_log,
&st.handshake.randoms.client);
sess.common.set_message_decrypter(cipher::new_tls13_read(suite, &read_key));
sess.common
.get_mut_key_schedule()
.current_server_traffic_secret = Some(read_key);
let exporter_secret = sess.common
.get_key_schedule()
.derive_logged_secret(SecretKind::ExporterMasterSecret,
&handshake_hash,
&*sess.config.key_log,
&st.handshake.randoms.client);
sess.common
.get_mut_key_schedule()
.current_exporter_secret = Some(exporter_secret);
/* The EndOfEarlyData message to server is still encrypted with early data keys,
* but appears in the transcript after the server Finished. */
if let Some(write_key) = maybe_write_key {
emit_end_of_early_data_tls13(&mut st.handshake, sess);
sess.common.early_traffic = false;
sess.early_data.finished();
sess.common.set_message_encrypter(cipher::new_tls13_write(suite, &write_key));
sess.common.get_mut_key_schedule().current_client_traffic_secret = Some(write_key);
}
/* Send our authentication/finished messages. These are still encrypted
* with our handshake keys. */
if st.client_auth.is_some() {
emit_certificate_tls13(&mut st.handshake,
st.client_auth.as_mut().unwrap(),
sess);
emit_certverify_tls13(&mut st.handshake,
st.client_auth.as_mut().unwrap(),
sess)?;
}
emit_finished_tls13(&mut st.handshake, sess);
/* Now move to our application traffic keys. */
hs::check_aligned_handshake(sess)?;
let write_key = sess.common
.get_key_schedule()
.derive_logged_secret(SecretKind::ClientApplicationTrafficSecret,
&handshake_hash,
&*sess.config.key_log,
&st.handshake.randoms.client);
sess.common.set_message_encrypter(cipher::new_tls13_write(suite, &write_key));
sess.common
.get_mut_key_schedule()
.current_client_traffic_secret = Some(write_key);
sess.common.we_now_encrypting();
sess.common.start_traffic();
let st = st.into_expect_traffic(fin);
#[cfg(feature = "quic")] {
if sess.common.protocol == Protocol::Quic {
let key_schedule = sess.common.key_schedule.as_ref().unwrap();
sess.common.quic.traffic_secrets = Some(quic::Secrets {
client: key_schedule.current_client_traffic_secret.clone().unwrap(),
server: key_schedule.current_server_traffic_secret.clone().unwrap(),
});
return Ok(Box::new(ExpectQUICTraffic(st)));
}
}
Ok(Box::new(st))
}
}
// -- Traffic transit state (TLS1.3) --
// In this state we can be sent tickets, keyupdates,
// and application data.
struct ExpectTraffic {
handshake: HandshakeDetails,
_cert_verified: verify::ServerCertVerified,
_sig_verified: verify::HandshakeSignatureValid,
_fin_verified: verify::FinishedMessageVerified,
}
impl ExpectTraffic {
fn handle_new_ticket_tls13(&mut self, sess: &mut ClientSessionImpl, m: Message) -> Result<(), TLSError> {
let nst = extract_handshake!(m, HandshakePayload::NewSessionTicketTLS13).unwrap();
let handshake_hash = self.handshake.transcript.get_current_hash();
let key_schedule = sess.common.get_key_schedule();
let resumption_master_secret =
key_schedule.derive(key_schedule.algorithm(), SecretKind::ResumptionMasterSecret, &handshake_hash);
let secret = sess.common
.get_key_schedule()
.derive_ticket_psk(&resumption_master_secret, &nst.nonce.0);
let mut value = persist::ClientSessionValue::new(ProtocolVersion::TLSv1_3,
sess.common.get_suite_assert().suite,
&SessionID::empty(),
nst.ticket.0.clone(),
secret);
value.set_times(ticketer::timebase(),
nst.lifetime,
nst.age_add);
if let Some(sz) = nst.get_max_early_data_size() {
value.set_max_early_data_size(sz);
#[cfg(feature = "quic")] {
if sess.common.protocol == Protocol::Quic {
if sz != 0 && sz != 0xffff_ffff {
return Err(TLSError::PeerMisbehavedError("invalid max_early_data_size".into()));
}
}
}
}
let key = persist::ClientSessionKey::session_for_dns_name(self.handshake.dns_name.as_ref());
#[allow(unused_mut)]
let mut ticket = value.get_encoding();
#[cfg(feature = "quic")] {
if sess.common.protocol == Protocol::Quic {
PayloadU16::encode_slice(sess.common.quic.params.as_ref().unwrap(), &mut ticket);
}
}
let worked = sess.config.session_persistence.put(key.get_encoding(),
ticket);
if worked {
debug!("Ticket saved");
} else {
debug!("Ticket not saved");
}
Ok(())
}
fn handle_key_update(&mut self, sess: &mut ClientSessionImpl, m: Message) -> Result<(), TLSError> {
let kur = extract_handshake!(m, HandshakePayload::KeyUpdate).unwrap();
sess.common.process_key_update(*kur, SecretKind::ServerApplicationTrafficSecret)
}
}
impl hs::State for ExpectTraffic {
fn check_message(&self, m: &Message) -> Result<(), TLSError> {
check_message(m,
&[ContentType::ApplicationData, ContentType::Handshake],
&[HandshakeType::NewSessionTicket, HandshakeType::KeyUpdate])
}
fn handle(mut self: Box<Self>, sess: &mut ClientSessionImpl, mut m: Message) -> hs::NextStateOrError {
if m.is_content_type(ContentType::ApplicationData) {
sess.common.take_received_plaintext(m.take_opaque_payload().unwrap());
} else if m.is_handshake_type(HandshakeType::NewSessionTicket) {
self.handle_new_ticket_tls13(sess, m)?;
} else if m.is_handshake_type(HandshakeType::KeyUpdate) {
self.handle_key_update(sess, m)?;
}
Ok(self)
}
}
#[cfg(feature = "quic")]
pub struct ExpectQUICTraffic(ExpectTraffic);
#[cfg(feature = "quic")]
impl hs::State for ExpectQUICTraffic {
fn check_message(&self, m: &Message) -> hs::CheckResult {
check_message(m, &[ContentType::Handshake], &[HandshakeType::NewSessionTicket])
}
fn handle(mut self: Box<Self>, sess: &mut ClientSessionImpl, m: Message) -> hs::NextStateOrError {
self.0.handle_new_ticket_tls13(sess, m)?;
Ok(self)
}
}
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