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rustls/rustls/src/server/hs.rs

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use crate::msgs::enums::{ContentType, HandshakeType, ProtocolVersion};
use crate::msgs::enums::{Compression, NamedGroup, ECPointFormat, CipherSuite};
use crate::msgs::enums::{ExtensionType, AlertDescription};
use crate::msgs::enums::{ClientCertificateType, SignatureScheme};
use crate::msgs::message::{Message, MessagePayload};
use crate::msgs::handshake::{HandshakePayload, SupportedSignatureSchemes};
use crate::msgs::handshake::{HandshakeMessagePayload, ServerHelloPayload, Random};
use crate::msgs::handshake::{ClientHelloPayload, ServerExtension, SessionID};
use crate::msgs::handshake::{ConvertProtocolNameList, ConvertServerNameList};
use crate::msgs::handshake::ClientExtension;
use crate::msgs::handshake::{ECPointFormatList, SupportedPointFormats};
use crate::msgs::handshake::{ServerECDHParams, DigitallySignedStruct};
use crate::msgs::handshake::{ServerKeyExchangePayload, ECDHEServerKeyExchange};
use crate::msgs::handshake::CertificateRequestPayload;
use crate::msgs::handshake::CertificateStatus;
use crate::msgs::codec::Codec;
use crate::msgs::persist;
use crate::session::SessionSecrets;
use crate::server::{ServerSessionImpl, ServerConfig};
use crate::suites;
use crate::verify;
use crate::util;
use crate::rand;
use crate::sign;
#[cfg(feature = "logging")]
use crate::log::{trace, debug};
use crate::error::TLSError;
use crate::handshake::check_handshake_message;
use webpki;
#[cfg(feature = "quic")]
use crate::session::Protocol;
use crate::server::common::{HandshakeDetails, ServerKXDetails};
use crate::server::{tls12, tls13};
macro_rules! extract_handshake(
( $m:expr, $t:path ) => (
match $m.payload {
MessagePayload::Handshake(ref hsp) => match hsp.payload {
$t(ref hm) => Some(hm),
_ => None
},
_ => None
}
)
);
pub type CheckResult = Result<(), TLSError>;
pub type NextState = Box<dyn State + Send + Sync>;
pub type NextStateOrError = Result<NextState, TLSError>;
pub trait State {
fn check_message(&self, m: &Message) -> CheckResult;
fn handle(self: Box<Self>, sess: &mut ServerSessionImpl, m: Message) -> NextStateOrError;
}
pub fn incompatible(sess: &mut ServerSessionImpl, why: &str) -> TLSError {
sess.common.send_fatal_alert(AlertDescription::HandshakeFailure);
TLSError::PeerIncompatibleError(why.to_string())
}
fn bad_version(sess: &mut ServerSessionImpl, why: &str) -> TLSError {
sess.common.send_fatal_alert(AlertDescription::ProtocolVersion);
TLSError::PeerIncompatibleError(why.to_string())
}
pub fn illegal_param(sess: &mut ServerSessionImpl, why: &str) -> TLSError {
sess.common.send_fatal_alert(AlertDescription::IllegalParameter);
TLSError::PeerMisbehavedError(why.to_string())
}
pub fn decode_error(sess: &mut ServerSessionImpl, why: &str) -> TLSError {
sess.common.send_fatal_alert(AlertDescription::DecodeError);
TLSError::PeerMisbehavedError(why.to_string())
}
pub fn can_resume(sess: &ServerSessionImpl,
handshake: &HandshakeDetails,
resumedata: &Option<persist::ServerSessionValue>) -> bool {
// The RFCs underspecify what happens if we try to resume to
// an unoffered/varying suite. We merely don't resume in weird cases.
//
// RFC 6066 says "A server that implements this extension MUST NOT accept
// the request to resume the session if the server_name extension contains
// a different name. Instead, it proceeds with a full handshake to
// establish a new session."
if let Some(ref resume) = *resumedata {
resume.cipher_suite == sess.common.get_suite_assert().suite &&
(resume.extended_ms == handshake.using_ems ||
(resume.extended_ms && !handshake.using_ems)) &&
same_dns_name_or_both_none(resume.sni.as_ref(), sess.sni.as_ref())
} else {
false
}
}
// Require an exact match for the purpose of comparing SNI DNS Names from two
// client hellos, even though a case-insensitive comparison might also be OK.
fn same_dns_name_or_both_none(a: Option<&webpki::DNSName>,
b: Option<&webpki::DNSName>) -> bool {
match (a, b) {
(Some(a), Some(b)) => {
let a: &str = a.as_ref().into();
let b: &str = b.as_ref().into();
a == b
},
(None, None) => true,
_ => false,
}
}
// Changing the keys must not span any fragmented handshake
// messages. Otherwise the defragmented messages will have
// been protected with two different record layer protections,
// which is illegal. Not mentioned in RFC.
pub fn check_aligned_handshake(sess: &mut ServerSessionImpl) -> Result<(), TLSError> {
if !sess.common.handshake_joiner.is_empty() {
Err(illegal_param(sess, "keys changed with pending hs fragment"))
} else {
Ok(())
}
}
pub fn save_sni(sess: &mut ServerSessionImpl,
sni: Option<webpki::DNSName>) {
if let Some(sni) = sni {
// Save the SNI into the session.
sess.set_sni(sni);
}
}
#[derive(Default)]
pub struct ExtensionProcessing {
// extensions to reply with
pub exts: Vec<ServerExtension>,
// effects on later handshake steps
pub send_cert_status: bool,
pub send_sct: bool,
pub send_ticket: bool,
}
impl ExtensionProcessing {
pub fn new() -> Self { Default::default() }
pub fn process_common(&mut self,
sess: &mut ServerSessionImpl,
server_key: Option<&mut sign::CertifiedKey>,
hello: &ClientHelloPayload,
resumedata: Option<&persist::ServerSessionValue>,
handshake: &HandshakeDetails)
-> Result<(), TLSError> {
// ALPN
let our_protocols = &sess.config.alpn_protocols;
let maybe_their_protocols = hello.get_alpn_extension();
if let Some(their_protocols) = maybe_their_protocols {
let their_proto_vecs = their_protocols.to_vecs();
if their_proto_vecs.iter().any(Vec::is_empty) {
return Err(TLSError::PeerMisbehavedError("client offered empty ALPN protocol"
.to_string()));
}
sess.alpn_protocol = util::first_in_both(our_protocols, &their_proto_vecs);
if let Some(ref selected_protocol) = sess.alpn_protocol {
debug!("Chosen ALPN protocol {:?}", selected_protocol);
self.exts.push(ServerExtension::make_alpn(&[selected_protocol]));
}
}
#[cfg(feature = "quic")] {
if sess.common.protocol == Protocol::Quic {
if let Some(params) = hello.get_quic_params_extension() {
sess.common.quic.params = Some(params);
}
if let Some(resume) = resumedata {
if sess.config.max_early_data_size > 0
&& hello.early_data_extension_offered()
&& resume.version == sess.common.negotiated_version.unwrap()
&& resume.cipher_suite == sess.common.get_suite_assert().suite
&& resume.alpn.as_ref().map(|x| &x.0) == sess.alpn_protocol.as_ref()
{
self.exts.push(ServerExtension::EarlyData);
} else {
// Clobber value set in tls13::emit_server_hello
sess.common.quic.early_secret = None;
}
}
}
}
let for_resume = resumedata.is_some();
// SNI
if !for_resume && hello.get_sni_extension().is_some() {
self.exts.push(ServerExtension::ServerNameAck);
}
// Send status_request response if we have one. This is not allowed
// if we're resuming, and is only triggered if we have an OCSP response
// to send.
if !for_resume &&
hello.find_extension(ExtensionType::StatusRequest).is_some() &&
server_key.is_some() &&
server_key.as_ref().unwrap().has_ocsp() {
self.send_cert_status = true;
if !sess.common.is_tls13() {
// Only TLS1.2 sends confirmation in ServerHello
self.exts.push(ServerExtension::CertificateStatusAck);
}
}
if !for_resume &&
hello.find_extension(ExtensionType::SCT).is_some() &&
server_key.is_some() &&
server_key.as_ref().unwrap().has_sct_list() {
self.send_sct = true;
if !sess.common.is_tls13() {
let sct_list = server_key
.unwrap()
.take_sct_list()
.unwrap();
self.exts.push(ServerExtension::make_sct(sct_list));
}
}
if !sess.common.is_tls13() {
}
self.exts.extend(handshake.extra_exts.iter().cloned());
Ok(())
}
fn process_tls12(&mut self, sess: &ServerSessionImpl, hello: &ClientHelloPayload,
handshake: &HandshakeDetails) {
// Renegotiation.
// (We don't do reneg at all, but would support the secure version if we did.)
let secure_reneg_offered =
hello.find_extension(ExtensionType::RenegotiationInfo).is_some() ||
hello.cipher_suites.contains(&CipherSuite::TLS_EMPTY_RENEGOTIATION_INFO_SCSV);
if secure_reneg_offered {
self.exts.push(ServerExtension::make_empty_renegotiation_info());
}
// Tickets:
// If we get any SessionTicket extension and have tickets enabled,
// we send an ack.
if hello.find_extension(ExtensionType::SessionTicket).is_some() &&
sess.config.ticketer.enabled() {
self.send_ticket = true;
self.exts.push(ServerExtension::SessionTicketAck);
}
// Confirm use of EMS if offered.
if handshake.using_ems {
self.exts.push(ServerExtension::ExtendedMasterSecretAck);
}
}
}
pub struct ExpectClientHello {
pub handshake: HandshakeDetails,
pub done_retry: bool,
pub send_cert_status: bool,
pub send_sct: bool,
pub send_ticket: bool,
}
impl ExpectClientHello {
pub fn new(server_config: &ServerConfig, extra_exts: Vec<ServerExtension>) -> ExpectClientHello {
let mut ech = ExpectClientHello {
handshake: HandshakeDetails::new(extra_exts),
done_retry: false,
send_cert_status: false,
send_sct: false,
send_ticket: false,
};
if server_config.verifier.offer_client_auth() {
ech.handshake.transcript.set_client_auth_enabled();
}
ech
}
fn into_expect_tls12_ccs(self) -> NextState {
Box::new(tls12::ExpectCCS {
handshake: self.handshake,
resuming: true,
send_ticket: self.send_ticket,
})
}
fn into_complete_tls13_client_hello_handling(self) -> tls13::CompleteClientHelloHandling {
tls13::CompleteClientHelloHandling {
handshake: self.handshake,
done_retry: self.done_retry,
send_cert_status: self.send_cert_status,
send_sct: self.send_sct,
send_ticket: self.send_ticket,
}
}
fn into_expect_tls12_certificate(self, kx: suites::KeyExchange) -> NextState {
Box::new(tls12::ExpectCertificate {
handshake: self.handshake,
server_kx: ServerKXDetails::new(kx),
send_ticket: self.send_ticket,
})
}
fn into_expect_tls12_client_kx(self, kx: suites::KeyExchange) -> NextState {
Box::new(tls12::ExpectClientKX {
handshake: self.handshake,
server_kx: ServerKXDetails::new(kx),
client_cert: None,
send_ticket: self.send_ticket,
})
}
fn emit_server_hello(&mut self,
sess: &mut ServerSessionImpl,
server_key: Option<&mut sign::CertifiedKey>,
hello: &ClientHelloPayload,
resumedata: Option<&persist::ServerSessionValue>)
-> Result<(), TLSError> {
let mut ep = ExtensionProcessing::new();
ep.process_common(sess, server_key, hello, resumedata, &self.handshake)?;
ep.process_tls12(sess, hello, &self.handshake);
self.send_ticket = ep.send_ticket;
self.send_cert_status = ep.send_cert_status;
self.send_sct = ep.send_sct;
let sh = Message {
typ: ContentType::Handshake,
version: ProtocolVersion::TLSv1_2,
payload: MessagePayload::Handshake(HandshakeMessagePayload {
typ: HandshakeType::ServerHello,
payload: HandshakePayload::ServerHello(ServerHelloPayload {
legacy_version: ProtocolVersion::TLSv1_2,
random: Random::from_slice(&self.handshake.randoms.server),
session_id: self.handshake.session_id,
cipher_suite: sess.common.get_suite_assert().suite,
compression_method: Compression::Null,
extensions: ep.exts,
}),
}),
};
trace!("sending server hello {:?}", sh);
self.handshake.transcript.add_message(&sh);
sess.common.send_msg(sh, false);
Ok(())
}
fn emit_certificate(&mut self,
sess: &mut ServerSessionImpl,
server_certkey: &mut sign::CertifiedKey) {
let cert_chain = server_certkey.take_cert();
let c = Message {
typ: ContentType::Handshake,
version: ProtocolVersion::TLSv1_2,
payload: MessagePayload::Handshake(HandshakeMessagePayload {
typ: HandshakeType::Certificate,
payload: HandshakePayload::Certificate(cert_chain),
}),
};
self.handshake.transcript.add_message(&c);
sess.common.send_msg(c, false);
}
fn emit_cert_status(&mut self,
sess: &mut ServerSessionImpl,
server_certkey: &mut sign::CertifiedKey) {
if !self.send_cert_status ||
!server_certkey.has_ocsp() {
return;
}
let ocsp = server_certkey.take_ocsp();
let st = CertificateStatus::new(ocsp.unwrap());
let c = Message {
typ: ContentType::Handshake,
version: ProtocolVersion::TLSv1_2,
payload: MessagePayload::Handshake(HandshakeMessagePayload {
typ: HandshakeType::CertificateStatus,
payload: HandshakePayload::CertificateStatus(st)
}),
};
self.handshake.transcript.add_message(&c);
sess.common.send_msg(c, false);
}
fn emit_server_kx(&mut self,
sess: &mut ServerSessionImpl,
sigschemes: Vec<SignatureScheme>,
group: NamedGroup,
server_certkey: &mut sign::CertifiedKey)
-> Result<suites::KeyExchange, TLSError> {
let kx = sess.common.get_suite_assert()
.start_server_kx(group)
.ok_or_else(|| TLSError::PeerMisbehavedError("key exchange failed".to_string()))?;
let secdh = ServerECDHParams::new(group, kx.pubkey.as_ref());
let mut msg = Vec::new();
msg.extend(&self.handshake.randoms.client);
msg.extend(&self.handshake.randoms.server);
secdh.encode(&mut msg);
let signing_key = &server_certkey.key;
let signer = signing_key.choose_scheme(&sigschemes)
.ok_or_else(|| TLSError::General("incompatible signing key".to_string()))?;
let sigscheme = signer.get_scheme();
let sig = signer.sign(&msg)?;
let skx = ServerKeyExchangePayload::ECDHE(ECDHEServerKeyExchange {
params: secdh,
dss: DigitallySignedStruct::new(sigscheme, sig),
});
let m = Message {
typ: ContentType::Handshake,
version: ProtocolVersion::TLSv1_2,
payload: MessagePayload::Handshake(HandshakeMessagePayload {
typ: HandshakeType::ServerKeyExchange,
payload: HandshakePayload::ServerKeyExchange(skx),
}),
};
self.handshake.transcript.add_message(&m);
sess.common.send_msg(m, false);
Ok(kx)
}
fn emit_certificate_req(&mut self, sess: &mut ServerSessionImpl) -> bool {
let client_auth = &sess.config.verifier;
if !client_auth.offer_client_auth() {
return false;
}
let names = client_auth.client_auth_root_subjects();
let cr = CertificateRequestPayload {
certtypes: vec![ ClientCertificateType::RSASign,
ClientCertificateType::ECDSASign ],
sigschemes: verify::supported_verify_schemes().to_vec(),
canames: names,
};
let m = Message {
typ: ContentType::Handshake,
version: ProtocolVersion::TLSv1_2,
payload: MessagePayload::Handshake(HandshakeMessagePayload {
typ: HandshakeType::CertificateRequest,
payload: HandshakePayload::CertificateRequest(cr),
}),
};
trace!("Sending CertificateRequest {:?}", m);
self.handshake.transcript.add_message(&m);
sess.common.send_msg(m, false);
true
}
fn emit_server_hello_done(&mut self, sess: &mut ServerSessionImpl) {
let m = Message {
typ: ContentType::Handshake,
version: ProtocolVersion::TLSv1_2,
payload: MessagePayload::Handshake(HandshakeMessagePayload {
typ: HandshakeType::ServerHelloDone,
payload: HandshakePayload::ServerHelloDone,
}),
};
self.handshake.transcript.add_message(&m);
sess.common.send_msg(m, false);
}
fn start_resumption(mut self,
sess: &mut ServerSessionImpl,
client_hello: &ClientHelloPayload,
sni: Option<&webpki::DNSName>,
id: &SessionID,
resumedata: persist::ServerSessionValue)
-> NextStateOrError {
debug!("Resuming session");
if resumedata.extended_ms && !self.handshake.using_ems {
return Err(illegal_param(sess, "refusing to resume without ems"));
}
self.handshake.session_id = *id;
self.emit_server_hello(sess, None, client_hello, Some(&resumedata))?;
let hashalg = sess.common.get_suite_assert().get_hash();
let secrets = SessionSecrets::new_resume(&self.handshake.randoms,
hashalg,
&resumedata.master_secret.0);
sess.config.key_log.log("CLIENT_RANDOM",
&secrets.randoms.client,
&secrets.master_secret);
sess.common.start_encryption_tls12(secrets);
sess.client_cert_chain = resumedata.client_cert_chain;
if self.send_ticket {
tls12::emit_ticket(&mut self.handshake, sess);
}
tls12::emit_ccs(sess);
tls12::emit_finished(&mut self.handshake, sess);
assert!(same_dns_name_or_both_none(sni, sess.get_sni()));
Ok(self.into_expect_tls12_ccs())
}
}
impl State for ExpectClientHello {
fn check_message(&self, m: &Message) -> CheckResult {
check_handshake_message(m, &[HandshakeType::ClientHello])
}
fn handle(mut self: Box<Self>, sess: &mut ServerSessionImpl, m: Message) -> NextStateOrError {
let client_hello = extract_handshake!(m, HandshakePayload::ClientHello).unwrap();
let tls13_enabled = sess.config.supports_version(ProtocolVersion::TLSv1_3);
let tls12_enabled = sess.config.supports_version(ProtocolVersion::TLSv1_2);
trace!("we got a clienthello {:?}", client_hello);
if !client_hello.compression_methods.contains(&Compression::Null) {
sess.common.send_fatal_alert(AlertDescription::IllegalParameter);
return Err(TLSError::PeerIncompatibleError("client did not offer Null compression"
.to_string()));
}
if client_hello.has_duplicate_extension() {
return Err(decode_error(sess, "client sent duplicate extensions"));
}
// Are we doing TLS1.3?
let maybe_versions_ext = client_hello.get_versions_extension();
if let Some(versions) = maybe_versions_ext {
if versions.contains(&ProtocolVersion::TLSv1_3) && tls13_enabled {
sess.common.negotiated_version = Some(ProtocolVersion::TLSv1_3);
} else if !versions.contains(&ProtocolVersion::TLSv1_2) || !tls12_enabled {
return Err(bad_version(sess, "TLS1.2 not offered/enabled"));
}
} else if client_hello.client_version.get_u16() < ProtocolVersion::TLSv1_2.get_u16() {
return Err(bad_version(sess, "Client does not support TLSv1_2"));
} else if !tls12_enabled && tls13_enabled {
return Err(bad_version(sess, "Server requires TLS1.3, but client omitted versions ext"));
}
if sess.common.negotiated_version == None {
sess.common.negotiated_version = Some(ProtocolVersion::TLSv1_2);
}
// Common to TLS1.2 and TLS1.3: ciphersuite and certificate selection.
let default_sigschemes_ext = SupportedSignatureSchemes::default();
// Extract and validate the SNI DNS name, if any, before giving it to
// the cert resolver. In particular, if it is invalid then we should
// send an Illegal Parameter alert instead of the Internal Error alert
// (or whatever) that we'd send if this were checked later or in a
// different way.
let sni: Option<webpki::DNSName> = match client_hello.get_sni_extension() {
Some(sni) => {
match sni.get_hostname() {
Some(sni) => Some(sni.into()),
None => {
return Err(illegal_param(sess,
"ClientHello SNI did not contain a hostname."));
},
}
},
None => None,
};
let sigschemes_ext = client_hello.get_sigalgs_extension()
.unwrap_or(&default_sigschemes_ext);
// Choose a certificate.
let mut certkey = {
let sni_ref = sni.as_ref().map(webpki::DNSName::as_ref);
trace!("sni {:?}", sni_ref);
trace!("sig schemes {:?}", sigschemes_ext);
let certkey = sess.config.cert_resolver.resolve(sni_ref, sigschemes_ext);
certkey.ok_or_else(|| {
sess.common.send_fatal_alert(AlertDescription::AccessDenied);
TLSError::General("no server certificate chain resolved".to_string())
})?
};
// Reduce our supported ciphersuites by the certificate.
// (no-op for TLS1.3)
let suitable_suites = suites::reduce_given_sigalg(&sess.config.ciphersuites,
certkey.key.algorithm());
// And version
let protocol_version = sess.common.negotiated_version.unwrap();
let suitable_suites = suites::reduce_given_version(&suitable_suites, protocol_version);
let maybe_ciphersuite = if sess.config.ignore_client_order {
suites::choose_ciphersuite_preferring_server(&client_hello.cipher_suites, &suitable_suites)
} else {
suites::choose_ciphersuite_preferring_client(&client_hello.cipher_suites, &suitable_suites)
};
if maybe_ciphersuite.is_none() {
return Err(incompatible(sess, "no ciphersuites in common"));
}
debug!("decided upon suite {:?}", maybe_ciphersuite.as_ref().unwrap());
sess.common.set_suite(maybe_ciphersuite.unwrap());
// Start handshake hash.
let starting_hash = sess.common.get_suite_assert().get_hash();
if !self.handshake.transcript.start_hash(starting_hash) {
sess.common.send_fatal_alert(AlertDescription::IllegalParameter);
return Err(TLSError::PeerIncompatibleError("hash differed on retry"
.to_string()));
}
// Save their Random.
client_hello.random.write_slice(&mut self.handshake.randoms.client);
if sess.common.is_tls13() {
return self.into_complete_tls13_client_hello_handling()
.handle_client_hello(sess, sni, certkey, &m);
}
// -- TLS1.2 only from hereon in --
save_sni(sess, sni.clone());
self.handshake.transcript.add_message(&m);
if client_hello.ems_support_offered() {
self.handshake.using_ems = true;
}
let groups_ext = client_hello.get_namedgroups_extension()
.ok_or_else(|| incompatible(sess, "client didn't describe groups"))?;
let ecpoints_ext = client_hello.get_ecpoints_extension()
.ok_or_else(|| incompatible(sess, "client didn't describe ec points"))?;
trace!("namedgroups {:?}", groups_ext);
trace!("ecpoints {:?}", ecpoints_ext);
if !ecpoints_ext.contains(&ECPointFormat::Uncompressed) {
sess.common.send_fatal_alert(AlertDescription::IllegalParameter);
return Err(TLSError::PeerIncompatibleError("client didn't support uncompressed ec points"
.to_string()));
}
// -- If TLS1.3 is enabled, signal the downgrade in the server random
if tls13_enabled {
self.handshake.randoms.set_tls12_downgrade_marker();
}
// -- Check for resumption --
// We can do this either by (in order of preference):
// 1. receiving a ticket that decrypts
// 2. receiving a sessionid that is in our cache
//
// If we receive a ticket, the sessionid won't be in our
// cache, so don't check.
//
// If either works, we end up with a ServerSessionValue
// which is passed to start_resumption and concludes
// our handling of the ClientHello.
//
let mut ticket_received = false;
if let Some(ticket_ext) = client_hello.get_ticket_extension() {
if let ClientExtension::SessionTicketOffer(ref ticket) = *ticket_ext {
ticket_received = true;
debug!("Ticket received");
let maybe_resume = sess.config
.ticketer
.decrypt(&ticket.0)
.and_then(|plain| persist::ServerSessionValue::read_bytes(&plain));
if can_resume(sess, &self.handshake, &maybe_resume) {
return self.start_resumption(sess,
client_hello, sni.as_ref(),
&client_hello.session_id,
maybe_resume.unwrap());
} else {
debug!("Ticket didn't decrypt");
}
}
}
// If we're not offered a ticket or a potential session ID,
// allocate a session ID.
if self.handshake.session_id.is_empty() && !ticket_received {
let mut bytes = [0u8; 32];
rand::fill_random(&mut bytes);
self.handshake.session_id = SessionID::new(&bytes);
}
// Perhaps resume? If we received a ticket, the sessionid
// does not correspond to a real session.
if !client_hello.session_id.is_empty() && !ticket_received {
let maybe_resume = sess.config.session_storage
.get(&client_hello.session_id.get_encoding())
.and_then(|x| persist::ServerSessionValue::read_bytes(&x));
if can_resume(sess, &self.handshake, &maybe_resume) {
return self.start_resumption(sess,
client_hello, sni.as_ref(),
&client_hello.session_id,
maybe_resume.unwrap());
}
}
// Now we have chosen a ciphersuite, we can make kx decisions.
let sigschemes = sess.common.get_suite_assert()
.resolve_sig_schemes(sigschemes_ext);
if sigschemes.is_empty() {
return Err(incompatible(sess, "no supported sig scheme"));
}
let group = util::first_in_both(suites::KeyExchange::supported_groups(),
groups_ext.as_slice())
.ok_or_else(|| incompatible(sess, "no supported group"))?;
let ecpoint = util::first_in_both(ECPointFormatList::supported().as_slice(),
ecpoints_ext.as_slice())
.ok_or_else(|| incompatible(sess, "no supported point format"))?;
debug_assert_eq!(ecpoint, ECPointFormat::Uncompressed);
self.emit_server_hello(sess, Some(&mut certkey), client_hello, None)?;
self.emit_certificate(sess, &mut certkey);
self.emit_cert_status(sess, &mut certkey);
let kx = self.emit_server_kx(sess, sigschemes, group, &mut certkey)?;
let doing_client_auth = self.emit_certificate_req(sess);
self.emit_server_hello_done(sess);
if doing_client_auth {
Ok(self.into_expect_tls12_certificate(kx))
} else {
Ok(self.into_expect_tls12_client_kx(kx))
}
}
}
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