mirror of https://github.com/ctz/rustls
558 lines
18 KiB
Rust
558 lines
18 KiB
Rust
/// This module contains optional APIs for implementing QUIC TLS.
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use crate::client::{ClientConfig, ClientSession, ClientSessionImpl};
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use crate::error::TLSError;
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use crate::key_schedule::hkdf_expand;
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use crate::msgs::enums::{AlertDescription, ContentType, ProtocolVersion};
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use crate::msgs::handshake::{ClientExtension, ServerExtension};
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use crate::msgs::message::{Message, MessagePayload};
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use crate::server::{ServerConfig, ServerSession, ServerSessionImpl};
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use crate::session::{Protocol, SessionCommon};
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use crate::suites::{BulkAlgorithm, SupportedCipherSuite, TLS13_AES_128_GCM_SHA256};
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use std::sync::Arc;
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use ring::{aead, hkdf};
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use webpki;
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/// Secrets used to encrypt/decrypt traffic
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#[derive(Clone, Debug)]
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pub(crate) struct Secrets {
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/// Secret used to encrypt packets transmitted by the client
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pub client: hkdf::Prk,
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/// Secret used to encrypt packets transmitted by the server
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pub server: hkdf::Prk,
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}
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impl Secrets {
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fn local_remote(&self, is_client: bool) -> (&hkdf::Prk, &hkdf::Prk) {
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if is_client {
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(&self.client, &self.server)
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} else {
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(&self.server, &self.client)
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}
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}
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}
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/// Generic methods for QUIC sessions
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pub trait QuicExt {
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/// Return the TLS-encoded transport parameters for the session's peer.
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fn get_quic_transport_parameters(&self) -> Option<&[u8]>;
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/// Compute the keys for encrypting/decrypting 0-RTT packets, if available
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fn get_0rtt_keys(&self) -> Option<DirectionalKeys>;
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/// Consume unencrypted TLS handshake data.
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///
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/// Handshake data obtained from separate encryption levels should be supplied in separate calls.
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fn read_hs(&mut self, plaintext: &[u8]) -> Result<(), TLSError>;
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/// Emit unencrypted TLS handshake data.
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///
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/// When this returns `Some(_)`, the new keys must be used for future handshake data.
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fn write_hs(&mut self, buf: &mut Vec<u8>) -> Option<Keys>;
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/// Emit the TLS description code of a fatal alert, if one has arisen.
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///
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/// Check after `read_hs` returns `Err(_)`.
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fn get_alert(&self) -> Option<AlertDescription>;
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/// Compute the keys to use following a 1-RTT key update
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///
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/// Must not be called until the handshake is complete
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fn next_1rtt_keys(&mut self) -> PacketKeySet;
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}
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impl QuicExt for ClientSession {
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fn get_quic_transport_parameters(&self) -> Option<&[u8]> {
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self.imp.common.quic.params.as_ref().map(|v| v.as_ref())
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}
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fn get_0rtt_keys(&self) -> Option<DirectionalKeys> {
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Some(DirectionalKeys::new(
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self.imp.resumption_ciphersuite?,
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self.imp.common.quic.early_secret.as_ref()?,
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))
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}
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fn read_hs(&mut self, plaintext: &[u8]) -> Result<(), TLSError> {
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read_hs(&mut self.imp.common, plaintext)?;
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self.imp.process_new_handshake_messages()
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}
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fn write_hs(&mut self, buf: &mut Vec<u8>) -> Option<Keys> {
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write_hs(&mut self.imp.common, buf)
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}
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fn get_alert(&self) -> Option<AlertDescription> {
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self.imp.common.quic.alert
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}
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fn next_1rtt_keys(&mut self) -> PacketKeySet {
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next_1rtt_keys(&mut self.imp.common)
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}
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}
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impl QuicExt for ServerSession {
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fn get_quic_transport_parameters(&self) -> Option<&[u8]> {
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self.imp.common.quic.params.as_ref().map(|v| v.as_ref())
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}
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fn get_0rtt_keys(&self) -> Option<DirectionalKeys> {
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Some(DirectionalKeys::new(
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self.imp.common.get_suite()?,
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self.imp.common.quic.early_secret.as_ref()?,
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))
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}
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fn read_hs(&mut self, plaintext: &[u8]) -> Result<(), TLSError> {
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read_hs(&mut self.imp.common, plaintext)?;
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self.imp.process_new_handshake_messages()
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}
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fn write_hs(&mut self, buf: &mut Vec<u8>) -> Option<Keys> {
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write_hs(&mut self.imp.common, buf)
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}
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fn get_alert(&self) -> Option<AlertDescription> {
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self.imp.common.quic.alert
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}
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fn next_1rtt_keys(&mut self) -> PacketKeySet {
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next_1rtt_keys(&mut self.imp.common)
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}
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}
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/// Keys used to communicate in a single direction
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pub struct DirectionalKeys {
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/// Encrypts or decrypts a packet's headers
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pub header: aead::quic::HeaderProtectionKey,
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/// Encrypts or decrypts the payload of a packet
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pub packet: PacketKey,
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}
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impl DirectionalKeys {
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fn new(suite: &'static SupportedCipherSuite, secret: &hkdf::Prk) -> Self {
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let hp_alg = match suite.bulk {
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BulkAlgorithm::AES_128_GCM => &aead::quic::AES_128,
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BulkAlgorithm::AES_256_GCM => &aead::quic::AES_256,
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BulkAlgorithm::CHACHA20_POLY1305 => &aead::quic::CHACHA20,
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};
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Self {
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header: hkdf_expand(secret, hp_alg, b"quic hp", &[]),
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packet: PacketKey::new(suite, secret),
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}
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}
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}
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/// Keys to encrypt or decrypt the payload of a packet
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pub struct PacketKey {
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/// Encrypts or decrypts a packet's payload
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pub key: aead::LessSafeKey,
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/// Computes unique nonces for each packet
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pub iv: Iv,
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}
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impl PacketKey {
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fn new(suite: &'static SupportedCipherSuite, secret: &hkdf::Prk) -> Self {
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Self {
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key: aead::LessSafeKey::new(hkdf_expand(
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secret,
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suite.get_aead_alg(),
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b"quic key",
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&[],
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)),
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iv: hkdf_expand(secret, IvLen, b"quic iv", &[]),
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}
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}
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}
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/// Packet protection keys for bidirectional 1-RTT communication
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pub struct PacketKeySet {
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/// Encrypts outgoing packets
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pub local: PacketKey,
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/// Decrypts incoming packets
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pub remote: PacketKey,
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}
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/// Computes unique nonces for each packet
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pub struct Iv([u8; aead::NONCE_LEN]);
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impl Iv {
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/// Compute the nonce to use for encrypting or decrypting `packet_number`
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pub fn nonce_for(&self, packet_number: u64) -> ring::aead::Nonce {
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let mut out = [0; aead::NONCE_LEN];
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out[4..].copy_from_slice(&packet_number.to_be_bytes());
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for (out, inp) in out.iter_mut().zip(self.0.iter()) {
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*out ^= inp;
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}
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aead::Nonce::assume_unique_for_key(out)
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}
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}
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impl From<hkdf::Okm<'_, IvLen>> for Iv {
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fn from(okm: hkdf::Okm<IvLen>) -> Self {
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let mut iv = [0; aead::NONCE_LEN];
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okm.fill(&mut iv[..]).unwrap();
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Iv(iv)
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}
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}
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struct IvLen;
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impl hkdf::KeyType for IvLen {
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fn len(&self) -> usize {
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aead::NONCE_LEN
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}
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}
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/// Complete set of keys used to communicate with the peer
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pub struct Keys {
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/// Encrypts outgoing packets
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pub local: DirectionalKeys,
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/// Decrypts incoming packets
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pub remote: DirectionalKeys,
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}
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impl Keys {
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/// Construct keys for use with initial packets
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pub fn initial(
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initial_salt: &hkdf::Salt,
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client_dst_connection_id: &[u8],
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is_client: bool,
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) -> Self {
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const CLIENT_LABEL: &[u8] = b"client in";
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const SERVER_LABEL: &[u8] = b"server in";
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let hs_secret = initial_salt.extract(client_dst_connection_id);
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let secrets = Secrets {
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client: hkdf_expand(&hs_secret, hkdf::HKDF_SHA256, CLIENT_LABEL, &[]),
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server: hkdf_expand(&hs_secret, hkdf::HKDF_SHA256, SERVER_LABEL, &[]),
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};
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Self::new(&TLS13_AES_128_GCM_SHA256, is_client, &secrets)
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}
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fn new(suite: &'static SupportedCipherSuite, is_client: bool, secrets: &Secrets) -> Self {
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let (local, remote) = secrets.local_remote(is_client);
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Keys {
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local: DirectionalKeys::new(suite, local),
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remote: DirectionalKeys::new(suite, remote),
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}
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}
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}
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fn read_hs(this: &mut SessionCommon, plaintext: &[u8]) -> Result<(), TLSError> {
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if this
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.handshake_joiner
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.take_message(Message {
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typ: ContentType::Handshake,
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version: ProtocolVersion::TLSv1_3,
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payload: MessagePayload::new_opaque(plaintext.into()),
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})
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.is_none()
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{
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this.quic.alert = Some(AlertDescription::DecodeError);
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return Err(TLSError::CorruptMessage);
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}
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Ok(())
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}
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fn write_hs(this: &mut SessionCommon, buf: &mut Vec<u8>) -> Option<Keys> {
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while let Some((_, msg)) = this.quic.hs_queue.pop_front() {
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buf.extend_from_slice(&msg);
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if let Some(&(true, _)) = this.quic.hs_queue.front() {
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if this.quic.hs_secrets.is_some() {
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// Allow the caller to switch keys before proceeding.
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break;
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}
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}
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}
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if let Some(secrets) = this.quic.hs_secrets.take() {
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return Some(Keys::new(this.get_suite_assert(), this.is_client, &secrets));
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}
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if let Some(secrets) = this.quic.traffic_secrets.as_ref() {
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if !this.quic.returned_traffic_keys {
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this.quic.returned_traffic_keys = true;
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return Some(Keys::new(this.get_suite_assert(), this.is_client, &secrets));
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}
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}
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None
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}
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fn next_1rtt_keys(this: &mut SessionCommon) -> PacketKeySet {
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let hkdf_alg = this.get_suite_assert().hkdf_algorithm;
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let secrets = this
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.quic
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.traffic_secrets
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.as_ref()
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.expect("traffic keys not yet available");
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let next = next_1rtt_secrets(hkdf_alg, secrets);
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let (local, remote) = next.local_remote(this.is_client);
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let keys = PacketKeySet {
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local: PacketKey::new(this.get_suite_assert(), local),
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remote: PacketKey::new(this.get_suite_assert(), remote),
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};
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this.quic.traffic_secrets = Some(next);
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keys
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}
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fn next_1rtt_secrets(hkdf_alg: hkdf::Algorithm, prev: &Secrets) -> Secrets {
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Secrets {
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client: hkdf_expand(&prev.client, hkdf_alg, b"quic ku", &[]),
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server: hkdf_expand(&prev.server, hkdf_alg, b"quic ku", &[]),
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}
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}
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/// Methods specific to QUIC client sessions
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pub trait ClientQuicExt {
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/// Make a new QUIC ClientSession. This differs from `ClientSession::new()`
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/// in that it takes an extra argument, `params`, which contains the
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/// TLS-encoded transport parameters to send.
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fn new_quic(
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config: &Arc<ClientConfig>,
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hostname: webpki::DNSNameRef,
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params: Vec<u8>,
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) -> ClientSession {
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assert!(
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config
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.versions
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.iter()
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.all(|x| x.get_u16() >= ProtocolVersion::TLSv1_3.get_u16()),
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"QUIC requires TLS version >= 1.3"
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);
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let mut imp = ClientSessionImpl::new(config);
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imp.common.protocol = Protocol::Quic;
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imp.start_handshake(
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hostname.into(),
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vec![ClientExtension::TransportParameters(params)],
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);
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ClientSession { imp }
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}
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}
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impl ClientQuicExt for ClientSession {}
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/// Methods specific to QUIC server sessions
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pub trait ServerQuicExt {
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/// Make a new QUIC ServerSession. This differs from `ServerSession::new()`
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/// in that it takes an extra argument, `params`, which contains the
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/// TLS-encoded transport parameters to send.
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fn new_quic(config: &Arc<ServerConfig>, params: Vec<u8>) -> ServerSession {
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assert!(
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config
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.versions
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.iter()
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.all(|x| x.get_u16() >= ProtocolVersion::TLSv1_3.get_u16()),
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"QUIC requires TLS version >= 1.3"
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);
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assert!(
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config.max_early_data_size == 0 || config.max_early_data_size == 0xffff_ffff,
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"QUIC sessions must set a max early data of 0 or 2^32-1"
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);
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let mut imp =
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ServerSessionImpl::new(config, vec![ServerExtension::TransportParameters(params)]);
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imp.common.protocol = Protocol::Quic;
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ServerSession { imp }
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}
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}
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impl ServerQuicExt for ServerSession {}
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#[cfg(test)]
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mod test {
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use super::*;
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#[test]
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fn initial_keys_test_vectors() {
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// Test vectors based on draft 27
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const INITIAL_SALT: [u8; 20] = [
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0xc3, 0xee, 0xf7, 0x12, 0xc7, 0x2e, 0xbb, 0x5a, 0x11, 0xa7, 0xd2, 0x43, 0x2b, 0xb4,
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0x63, 0x65, 0xbe, 0xf9, 0xf5, 0x02,
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];
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const CONNECTION_ID: &[u8] = &[0x83, 0x94, 0xc8, 0xf0, 0x3e, 0x51, 0x57, 0x08];
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const PACKET_NUMBER: u64 = 42;
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let initial_salt = hkdf::Salt::new(hkdf::HKDF_SHA256, &INITIAL_SALT);
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let server_keys = Keys::initial(&initial_salt, &CONNECTION_ID, false);
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let client_keys = Keys::initial(&initial_salt, &CONNECTION_ID, true);
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// Nonces
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const SERVER_NONCE: [u8; 12] = [
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0x5e, 0x5a, 0xe6, 0x51, 0xfd, 0x1e, 0x84, 0x95, 0xaf, 0x13, 0x50, 0xa1,
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];
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assert_eq!(
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server_keys
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.local
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.packet
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.iv
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.nonce_for(PACKET_NUMBER)
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.as_ref(),
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&SERVER_NONCE
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);
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assert_eq!(
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client_keys
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.remote
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.packet
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.iv
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.nonce_for(PACKET_NUMBER)
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.as_ref(),
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&SERVER_NONCE
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);
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const CLIENT_NONCE: [u8; 12] = [
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0x86, 0x81, 0x35, 0x94, 0x10, 0xa7, 0x0b, 0xb9, 0xc9, 0x2f, 0x04, 0x0a,
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];
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assert_eq!(
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server_keys
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.remote
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.packet
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.iv
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.nonce_for(PACKET_NUMBER)
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.as_ref(),
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&CLIENT_NONCE
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);
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assert_eq!(
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client_keys
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.local
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.packet
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.iv
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.nonce_for(PACKET_NUMBER)
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.as_ref(),
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&CLIENT_NONCE
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);
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// Header encryption mask
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const SAMPLE: &[u8] = &[
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0x70, 0x02, 0x59, 0x6f, 0x99, 0xae, 0x67, 0xab, 0xf6, 0x5a, 0x58, 0x52, 0xf5, 0x4f,
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0x58, 0xc3,
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];
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const SERVER_MASK: [u8; 5] = [0x38, 0x16, 0x8a, 0x0c, 0x25];
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assert_eq!(
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server_keys.local.header.new_mask(SAMPLE).unwrap(),
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SERVER_MASK
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);
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assert_eq!(
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client_keys.remote.header.new_mask(SAMPLE).unwrap(),
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SERVER_MASK
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);
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const CLIENT_MASK: [u8; 5] = [0xae, 0x96, 0x2e, 0x67, 0xec];
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assert_eq!(
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server_keys.remote.header.new_mask(SAMPLE).unwrap(),
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CLIENT_MASK
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);
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assert_eq!(
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client_keys.local.header.new_mask(SAMPLE).unwrap(),
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CLIENT_MASK
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);
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const AAD: &[u8] = &[
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0xc9, 0xff, 0x00, 0x00, 0x1b, 0x00, 0x08, 0xf0, 0x67, 0xa5, 0x50, 0x2a, 0x42, 0x62,
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0xb5, 0x00, 0x40, 0x74, 0x16, 0x8b,
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];
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let aad = aead::Aad::from(AAD);
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const PLAINTEXT: [u8; 12] = [
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0x0d, 0x00, 0x00, 0x00, 0x00, 0x18, 0x41, 0x0a, 0x02, 0x00, 0x00, 0x56,
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];
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let mut payload = PLAINTEXT;
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let server_nonce = server_keys.local.packet.iv.nonce_for(PACKET_NUMBER);
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let tag = server_keys
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.local
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.packet
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.key
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.seal_in_place_separate_tag(server_nonce, aad, &mut payload)
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.unwrap();
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assert_eq!(
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payload,
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[0x0d, 0x91, 0x96, 0x31, 0xc0, 0xeb, 0x84, 0xf2, 0x88, 0x59, 0xfe, 0xc0]
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);
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assert_eq!(
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tag.as_ref(),
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&[
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0xdf, 0xee, 0x06, 0x81, 0x9e, 0x7a, 0x08, 0x34, 0xe4, 0x94, 0x19, 0x79, 0x5f, 0xe0,
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0xd7, 0x3f
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]
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);
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let aad = aead::Aad::from(AAD);
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let mut payload = PLAINTEXT;
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let client_nonce = client_keys.local.packet.iv.nonce_for(PACKET_NUMBER);
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let tag = client_keys
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.local
|
|
.packet
|
|
.key
|
|
.seal_in_place_separate_tag(client_nonce, aad, &mut payload)
|
|
.unwrap();
|
|
assert_eq!(
|
|
payload,
|
|
[0x89, 0x6c, 0x66, 0x91, 0xe0, 0x9f, 0x47, 0x7a, 0x91, 0x42, 0xa4, 0x46]
|
|
);
|
|
assert_eq!(
|
|
tag.as_ref(),
|
|
&[
|
|
0xb6, 0xff, 0xef, 0x89, 0xd5, 0xcb, 0x53, 0xd0, 0x98, 0xf7, 0x40, 0xa, 0x8d, 0x97,
|
|
0x72, 0x6e
|
|
]
|
|
);
|
|
}
|
|
|
|
#[test]
|
|
fn key_update_test_vector() {
|
|
fn equal_prk(x: &hkdf::Prk, y: &hkdf::Prk) -> bool {
|
|
let mut x_data = [0; 16];
|
|
let mut y_data = [0; 16];
|
|
let x_okm = x.expand(&[b"info"], &aead::quic::AES_128).unwrap();
|
|
x_okm.fill(&mut x_data[..]).unwrap();
|
|
let y_okm = y.expand(&[b"info"], &aead::quic::AES_128).unwrap();
|
|
y_okm.fill(&mut y_data[..]).unwrap();
|
|
x_data == y_data
|
|
}
|
|
|
|
let initial = Secrets {
|
|
// Constant dummy values for reproducibility
|
|
client: hkdf::Prk::new_less_safe(
|
|
hkdf::HKDF_SHA256,
|
|
&[
|
|
0xb8, 0x76, 0x77, 0x08, 0xf8, 0x77, 0x23, 0x58, 0xa6, 0xea, 0x9f, 0xc4, 0x3e,
|
|
0x4a, 0xdd, 0x2c, 0x96, 0x1b, 0x3f, 0x52, 0x87, 0xa6, 0xd1, 0x46, 0x7e, 0xe0,
|
|
0xae, 0xab, 0x33, 0x72, 0x4d, 0xbf,
|
|
],
|
|
),
|
|
server: hkdf::Prk::new_less_safe(
|
|
hkdf::HKDF_SHA256,
|
|
&[
|
|
0x42, 0xdc, 0x97, 0x21, 0x40, 0xe0, 0xf2, 0xe3, 0x98, 0x45, 0xb7, 0x67, 0x61,
|
|
0x34, 0x39, 0xdc, 0x67, 0x58, 0xca, 0x43, 0x25, 0x9b, 0x87, 0x85, 0x06, 0x82,
|
|
0x4e, 0xb1, 0xe4, 0x38, 0xd8, 0x55,
|
|
],
|
|
),
|
|
};
|
|
let updated = next_1rtt_secrets(hkdf::HKDF_SHA256, &initial);
|
|
|
|
assert!(equal_prk(
|
|
&updated.client,
|
|
&hkdf::Prk::new_less_safe(
|
|
hkdf::HKDF_SHA256,
|
|
&[
|
|
0x42, 0xca, 0xc8, 0xc9, 0x1c, 0xd5, 0xeb, 0x40, 0x68, 0x2e, 0x43, 0x2e, 0xdf,
|
|
0x2d, 0x2b, 0xe9, 0xf4, 0x1a, 0x52, 0xca, 0x6b, 0x22, 0xd8, 0xe6, 0xcd, 0xb1,
|
|
0xe8, 0xac, 0xa9, 0x6, 0x1f, 0xce
|
|
]
|
|
)
|
|
));
|
|
assert!(equal_prk(
|
|
&updated.server,
|
|
&hkdf::Prk::new_less_safe(
|
|
hkdf::HKDF_SHA256,
|
|
&[
|
|
0xeb, 0x7f, 0x5e, 0x2a, 0x12, 0x3f, 0x40, 0x7d, 0xb4, 0x99, 0xe3, 0x61, 0xca,
|
|
0xe5, 0x90, 0xd4, 0xd9, 0x92, 0xe1, 0x4b, 0x7a, 0xce, 0x3, 0xc2, 0x44, 0xe0,
|
|
0x42, 0x21, 0x15, 0xb6, 0xd3, 0x8a
|
|
]
|
|
)
|
|
));
|
|
}
|
|
}
|