mirror of https://github.com/ctz/rustls
1087 lines
37 KiB
Rust
1087 lines
37 KiB
Rust
use crate::check::inappropriate_handshake_message;
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#[cfg(feature = "quic")]
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use crate::conn::Protocol;
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#[cfg(feature = "secret_extraction")]
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use crate::conn::Side;
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use crate::conn::{CommonState, ConnectionRandoms, State};
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use crate::enums::{ProtocolVersion, SignatureScheme};
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use crate::error::{Error, PeerIncompatible, PeerMisbehaved};
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use crate::hash_hs::{HandshakeHash, HandshakeHashBuffer};
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use crate::kx;
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#[cfg(feature = "logging")]
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use crate::log::{debug, trace, warn};
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use crate::msgs::base::{Payload, PayloadU8};
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use crate::msgs::ccs::ChangeCipherSpecPayload;
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use crate::msgs::enums::AlertDescription;
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use crate::msgs::enums::KeyUpdateRequest;
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use crate::msgs::enums::{ContentType, ExtensionType, HandshakeType};
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use crate::msgs::handshake::ClientExtension;
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use crate::msgs::handshake::DigitallySignedStruct;
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use crate::msgs::handshake::EncryptedExtensions;
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use crate::msgs::handshake::NewSessionTicketPayloadTLS13;
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use crate::msgs::handshake::{CertificateEntry, CertificatePayloadTLS13};
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use crate::msgs::handshake::{HandshakeMessagePayload, HandshakePayload};
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use crate::msgs::handshake::{HasServerExtensions, ServerHelloPayload};
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use crate::msgs::handshake::{PresharedKeyIdentity, PresharedKeyOffer};
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use crate::msgs::message::{Message, MessagePayload};
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use crate::msgs::persist;
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#[cfg(feature = "secret_extraction")]
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use crate::suites::PartiallyExtractedSecrets;
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use crate::tls13::key_schedule::{
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KeyScheduleEarly, KeyScheduleHandshake, KeySchedulePreHandshake, KeyScheduleTraffic,
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};
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use crate::tls13::Tls13CipherSuite;
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use crate::verify;
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use crate::{sign, KeyLog};
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use super::client_conn::ClientConnectionData;
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use super::hs::ClientContext;
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use crate::client::common::ServerCertDetails;
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use crate::client::common::{ClientAuthDetails, ClientHelloDetails};
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use crate::client::{hs, ClientConfig, ClientSessionStore, ServerName};
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use crate::ticketer::TimeBase;
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use ring::constant_time;
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use crate::sign::{CertifiedKey, Signer};
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use std::sync::Arc;
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// Extensions we expect in plaintext in the ServerHello.
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static ALLOWED_PLAINTEXT_EXTS: &[ExtensionType] = &[
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ExtensionType::KeyShare,
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ExtensionType::PreSharedKey,
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ExtensionType::SupportedVersions,
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];
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// Only the intersection of things we offer, and those disallowed
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// in TLS1.3
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static DISALLOWED_TLS13_EXTS: &[ExtensionType] = &[
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ExtensionType::ECPointFormats,
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ExtensionType::SessionTicket,
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ExtensionType::RenegotiationInfo,
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ExtensionType::ExtendedMasterSecret,
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];
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pub(super) fn handle_server_hello(
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config: Arc<ClientConfig>,
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cx: &mut ClientContext,
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server_hello: &ServerHelloPayload,
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mut resuming_session: Option<persist::Tls13ClientSessionValue>,
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server_name: ServerName,
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randoms: ConnectionRandoms,
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suite: &'static Tls13CipherSuite,
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transcript: HandshakeHash,
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early_key_schedule: Option<KeyScheduleEarly>,
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hello: ClientHelloDetails,
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our_key_share: kx::KeyExchange,
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mut sent_tls13_fake_ccs: bool,
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) -> hs::NextStateOrError {
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validate_server_hello(cx.common, server_hello)?;
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let their_key_share = server_hello
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.get_key_share()
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.ok_or_else(|| {
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cx.common
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.send_fatal_alert(AlertDescription::MissingExtension);
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Error::PeerMisbehaved(PeerMisbehaved::MissingKeyShare)
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})?;
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if our_key_share.group() != their_key_share.group {
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return Err(cx
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.common
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.illegal_param(PeerMisbehaved::WrongGroupForKeyShare));
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}
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let key_schedule_pre_handshake = if let (Some(selected_psk), Some(early_key_schedule)) =
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(server_hello.get_psk_index(), early_key_schedule)
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{
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if let Some(ref resuming) = resuming_session {
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let resuming_suite = match suite.can_resume_from(resuming.suite()) {
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Some(resuming) => resuming,
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None => {
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return Err(cx.common.illegal_param(
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PeerMisbehaved::ResumptionOfferedWithIncompatibleCipherSuite,
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));
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}
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};
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// If the server varies the suite here, we will have encrypted early data with
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// the wrong suite.
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if cx.data.early_data.is_enabled() && resuming_suite != suite {
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return Err(cx
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.common
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.illegal_param(PeerMisbehaved::EarlyDataOfferedWithVariedCipherSuite));
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}
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if selected_psk != 0 {
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return Err(cx
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.common
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.illegal_param(PeerMisbehaved::SelectedInvalidPsk));
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}
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debug!("Resuming using PSK");
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// The key schedule has been initialized and set in fill_in_psk_binder()
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} else {
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return Err(PeerMisbehaved::SelectedUnofferedPsk.into());
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}
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KeySchedulePreHandshake::from(early_key_schedule)
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} else {
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debug!("Not resuming");
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// Discard the early data key schedule.
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cx.data.early_data.rejected();
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cx.common.early_traffic = false;
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resuming_session.take();
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KeySchedulePreHandshake::new(suite)
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};
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let key_schedule = our_key_share.complete(&their_key_share.payload.0, |secret| {
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Ok(key_schedule_pre_handshake.into_handshake(secret))
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})?;
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// Remember what KX group the server liked for next time.
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config
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.session_storage
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.set_kx_hint(&server_name, their_key_share.group);
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// If we change keying when a subsequent handshake message is being joined,
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// the two halves will have different record layer protections. Disallow this.
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cx.common.check_aligned_handshake()?;
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let hash_at_client_recvd_server_hello = transcript.get_current_hash();
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let key_schedule = key_schedule.derive_client_handshake_secrets(
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cx.data.early_data.is_enabled(),
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hash_at_client_recvd_server_hello,
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suite,
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&*config.key_log,
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&randoms.client,
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cx.common,
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);
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emit_fake_ccs(&mut sent_tls13_fake_ccs, cx.common);
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Ok(Box::new(ExpectEncryptedExtensions {
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config,
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resuming_session,
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server_name,
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randoms,
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suite,
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transcript,
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key_schedule,
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hello,
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}))
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}
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fn validate_server_hello(
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common: &mut CommonState,
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server_hello: &ServerHelloPayload,
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) -> Result<(), Error> {
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for ext in &server_hello.extensions {
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if !ALLOWED_PLAINTEXT_EXTS.contains(&ext.get_type()) {
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common.send_fatal_alert(AlertDescription::UnsupportedExtension);
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return Err(PeerMisbehaved::UnexpectedCleartextExtension.into());
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}
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}
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Ok(())
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}
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pub(super) fn initial_key_share(
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config: &ClientConfig,
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server_name: &ServerName,
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) -> Result<kx::KeyExchange, Error> {
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let group = config
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.session_storage
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.kx_hint(server_name)
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.and_then(|group| kx::KeyExchange::choose(group, &config.kx_groups))
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.unwrap_or_else(|| {
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config
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.kx_groups
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.first()
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.expect("No kx groups configured")
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});
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kx::KeyExchange::start(group).ok_or(Error::FailedToGetRandomBytes)
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}
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/// This implements the horrifying TLS1.3 hack where PSK binders have a
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/// data dependency on the message they are contained within.
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pub(super) fn fill_in_psk_binder(
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resuming: &persist::Tls13ClientSessionValue,
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transcript: &HandshakeHashBuffer,
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hmp: &mut HandshakeMessagePayload,
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) -> KeyScheduleEarly {
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// We need to know the hash function of the suite we're trying to resume into.
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let suite = resuming.suite();
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let suite_hash = suite.hash_algorithm();
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// The binder is calculated over the clienthello, but doesn't include itself or its
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// length, or the length of its container.
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let binder_plaintext = hmp.get_encoding_for_binder_signing();
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let handshake_hash = transcript.get_hash_given(suite_hash, &binder_plaintext);
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// Run a fake key_schedule to simulate what the server will do if it chooses
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// to resume.
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let key_schedule = KeyScheduleEarly::new(suite, resuming.secret());
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let real_binder = key_schedule.resumption_psk_binder_key_and_sign_verify_data(&handshake_hash);
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if let HandshakePayload::ClientHello(ref mut ch) = hmp.payload {
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ch.set_psk_binder(real_binder.as_ref());
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};
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key_schedule
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}
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pub(super) fn prepare_resumption(
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config: &ClientConfig,
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cx: &mut ClientContext<'_>,
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ticket: Vec<u8>,
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resuming_session: &persist::Retrieved<&persist::Tls13ClientSessionValue>,
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exts: &mut Vec<ClientExtension>,
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doing_retry: bool,
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) {
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let resuming_suite = resuming_session.suite();
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cx.common.suite = Some(resuming_suite.into());
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cx.data.resumption_ciphersuite = Some(resuming_suite.into());
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// The EarlyData extension MUST be supplied together with the
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// PreSharedKey extension.
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let max_early_data_size = resuming_session.max_early_data_size();
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if config.enable_early_data && max_early_data_size > 0 && !doing_retry {
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cx.data
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.early_data
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.enable(max_early_data_size as usize);
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exts.push(ClientExtension::EarlyData);
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}
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// Finally, and only for TLS1.3 with a ticket resumption, include a binder
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// for our ticket. This must go last.
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//
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// Include an empty binder. It gets filled in below because it depends on
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// the message it's contained in (!!!).
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let obfuscated_ticket_age = resuming_session.obfuscated_ticket_age();
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let binder_len = resuming_suite
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.hash_algorithm()
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.output_len;
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let binder = vec![0u8; binder_len];
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let psk_identity = PresharedKeyIdentity::new(ticket, obfuscated_ticket_age);
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let psk_ext = PresharedKeyOffer::new(psk_identity, binder);
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exts.push(ClientExtension::PresharedKey(psk_ext));
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}
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pub(super) fn derive_early_traffic_secret(
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key_log: &dyn KeyLog,
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cx: &mut ClientContext<'_>,
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resuming_suite: &'static Tls13CipherSuite,
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early_key_schedule: &KeyScheduleEarly,
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sent_tls13_fake_ccs: &mut bool,
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transcript_buffer: &HandshakeHashBuffer,
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client_random: &[u8; 32],
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) {
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// For middlebox compatibility
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emit_fake_ccs(sent_tls13_fake_ccs, cx.common);
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let client_hello_hash = transcript_buffer.get_hash_given(resuming_suite.hash_algorithm(), &[]);
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early_key_schedule.client_early_traffic_secret(
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&client_hello_hash,
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key_log,
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client_random,
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cx.common,
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);
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// Now the client can send encrypted early data
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cx.common.early_traffic = true;
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trace!("Starting early data traffic");
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}
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pub(super) fn emit_fake_ccs(sent_tls13_fake_ccs: &mut bool, common: &mut CommonState) {
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if common.is_quic() {
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return;
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}
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if std::mem::replace(sent_tls13_fake_ccs, true) {
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return;
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}
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let m = Message {
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version: ProtocolVersion::TLSv1_2,
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payload: MessagePayload::ChangeCipherSpec(ChangeCipherSpecPayload {}),
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};
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common.send_msg(m, false);
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}
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fn validate_encrypted_extensions(
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common: &mut CommonState,
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hello: &ClientHelloDetails,
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exts: &EncryptedExtensions,
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) -> Result<(), Error> {
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if exts.has_duplicate_extension() {
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common.send_fatal_alert(AlertDescription::DecodeError);
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return Err(PeerMisbehaved::DuplicateEncryptedExtensions.into());
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}
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if hello.server_sent_unsolicited_extensions(exts, &[]) {
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common.send_fatal_alert(AlertDescription::UnsupportedExtension);
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return Err(PeerMisbehaved::UnsolicitedEncryptedExtension.into());
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}
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for ext in exts {
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if ALLOWED_PLAINTEXT_EXTS.contains(&ext.get_type())
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|| DISALLOWED_TLS13_EXTS.contains(&ext.get_type())
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{
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common.send_fatal_alert(AlertDescription::UnsupportedExtension);
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return Err(PeerMisbehaved::DisallowedEncryptedExtension.into());
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}
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}
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Ok(())
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}
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struct ExpectEncryptedExtensions {
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config: Arc<ClientConfig>,
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resuming_session: Option<persist::Tls13ClientSessionValue>,
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server_name: ServerName,
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randoms: ConnectionRandoms,
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suite: &'static Tls13CipherSuite,
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transcript: HandshakeHash,
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key_schedule: KeyScheduleHandshake,
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hello: ClientHelloDetails,
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}
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impl State<ClientConnectionData> for ExpectEncryptedExtensions {
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fn handle(mut self: Box<Self>, cx: &mut ClientContext<'_>, m: Message) -> hs::NextStateOrError {
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let exts = require_handshake_msg!(
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m,
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HandshakeType::EncryptedExtensions,
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HandshakePayload::EncryptedExtensions
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)?;
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debug!("TLS1.3 encrypted extensions: {:?}", exts);
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self.transcript.add_message(&m);
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validate_encrypted_extensions(cx.common, &self.hello, exts)?;
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hs::process_alpn_protocol(cx.common, &self.config, exts.get_alpn_protocol())?;
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#[cfg(feature = "quic")]
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{
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// QUIC transport parameters
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if cx.common.is_quic() {
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match exts.get_quic_params_extension() {
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Some(params) => cx.common.quic.params = Some(params),
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None => {
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return Err(cx
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.common
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.missing_extension(PeerMisbehaved::MissingQuicTransportParameters));
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}
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}
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}
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}
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if let Some(resuming_session) = self.resuming_session {
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let was_early_traffic = cx.common.early_traffic;
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if was_early_traffic {
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if exts.early_data_extension_offered() {
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cx.data.early_data.accepted();
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} else {
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cx.data.early_data.rejected();
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cx.common.early_traffic = false;
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}
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}
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if was_early_traffic && !cx.common.early_traffic {
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// If no early traffic, set the encryption key for handshakes
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self.key_schedule
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.set_handshake_encrypter(cx.common);
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}
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cx.common.peer_certificates = Some(
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resuming_session
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.server_cert_chain()
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.to_vec(),
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);
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// We *don't* reverify the certificate chain here: resumption is a
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// continuation of the previous session in terms of security policy.
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let cert_verified = verify::ServerCertVerified::assertion();
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let sig_verified = verify::HandshakeSignatureValid::assertion();
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Ok(Box::new(ExpectFinished {
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config: self.config,
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server_name: self.server_name,
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randoms: self.randoms,
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suite: self.suite,
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transcript: self.transcript,
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key_schedule: self.key_schedule,
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client_auth: None,
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cert_verified,
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sig_verified,
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}))
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} else {
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if exts.early_data_extension_offered() {
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return Err(PeerMisbehaved::EarlyDataExtensionWithoutResumption.into());
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}
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Ok(Box::new(ExpectCertificateOrCertReq {
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config: self.config,
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server_name: self.server_name,
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randoms: self.randoms,
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suite: self.suite,
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transcript: self.transcript,
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key_schedule: self.key_schedule,
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may_send_sct_list: self.hello.server_may_send_sct_list(),
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}))
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}
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}
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}
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struct ExpectCertificateOrCertReq {
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config: Arc<ClientConfig>,
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server_name: ServerName,
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randoms: ConnectionRandoms,
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suite: &'static Tls13CipherSuite,
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transcript: HandshakeHash,
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key_schedule: KeyScheduleHandshake,
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may_send_sct_list: bool,
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}
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impl State<ClientConnectionData> for ExpectCertificateOrCertReq {
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fn handle(self: Box<Self>, cx: &mut ClientContext<'_>, m: Message) -> hs::NextStateOrError {
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match m.payload {
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MessagePayload::Handshake {
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parsed:
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HandshakeMessagePayload {
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payload: HandshakePayload::CertificateTLS13(..),
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..
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},
|
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..
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} => Box::new(ExpectCertificate {
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config: self.config,
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server_name: self.server_name,
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randoms: self.randoms,
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suite: self.suite,
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transcript: self.transcript,
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key_schedule: self.key_schedule,
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may_send_sct_list: self.may_send_sct_list,
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client_auth: None,
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})
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.handle(cx, m),
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MessagePayload::Handshake {
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parsed:
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HandshakeMessagePayload {
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payload: HandshakePayload::CertificateRequestTLS13(..),
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..
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},
|
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..
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} => Box::new(ExpectCertificateRequest {
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config: self.config,
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server_name: self.server_name,
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randoms: self.randoms,
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suite: self.suite,
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transcript: self.transcript,
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key_schedule: self.key_schedule,
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may_send_sct_list: self.may_send_sct_list,
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})
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.handle(cx, m),
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payload => Err(inappropriate_handshake_message(
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&payload,
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&[ContentType::Handshake],
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&[
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HandshakeType::Certificate,
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HandshakeType::CertificateRequest,
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],
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)),
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}
|
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}
|
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}
|
|
|
|
// TLS1.3 version of CertificateRequest handling. We then move to expecting the server
|
|
// Certificate. Unfortunately the CertificateRequest type changed in an annoying way
|
|
// in TLS1.3.
|
|
struct ExpectCertificateRequest {
|
|
config: Arc<ClientConfig>,
|
|
server_name: ServerName,
|
|
randoms: ConnectionRandoms,
|
|
suite: &'static Tls13CipherSuite,
|
|
transcript: HandshakeHash,
|
|
key_schedule: KeyScheduleHandshake,
|
|
may_send_sct_list: bool,
|
|
}
|
|
|
|
impl State<ClientConnectionData> for ExpectCertificateRequest {
|
|
fn handle(mut self: Box<Self>, cx: &mut ClientContext<'_>, m: Message) -> hs::NextStateOrError {
|
|
let certreq = &require_handshake_msg!(
|
|
m,
|
|
HandshakeType::CertificateRequest,
|
|
HandshakePayload::CertificateRequestTLS13
|
|
)?;
|
|
self.transcript.add_message(&m);
|
|
debug!("Got CertificateRequest {:?}", certreq);
|
|
|
|
// Fortunately the problems here in TLS1.2 and prior are corrected in
|
|
// TLS1.3.
|
|
|
|
// Must be empty during handshake.
|
|
if !certreq.context.0.is_empty() {
|
|
warn!("Server sent non-empty certreq context");
|
|
cx.common
|
|
.send_fatal_alert(AlertDescription::DecodeError);
|
|
return Err(Error::CorruptMessagePayload(ContentType::Handshake));
|
|
}
|
|
|
|
let tls13_sign_schemes = sign::supported_sign_tls13();
|
|
let no_sigschemes = Vec::new();
|
|
let compat_sigschemes = certreq
|
|
.get_sigalgs_extension()
|
|
.unwrap_or(&no_sigschemes)
|
|
.iter()
|
|
.cloned()
|
|
.filter(|scheme| tls13_sign_schemes.contains(scheme))
|
|
.collect::<Vec<SignatureScheme>>();
|
|
|
|
if compat_sigschemes.is_empty() {
|
|
cx.common
|
|
.send_fatal_alert(AlertDescription::HandshakeFailure);
|
|
return Err(PeerIncompatible::NoCertificateRequestSignatureSchemesInCommon.into());
|
|
}
|
|
|
|
let client_auth = ClientAuthDetails::resolve(
|
|
self.config
|
|
.client_auth_cert_resolver
|
|
.as_ref(),
|
|
certreq.get_authorities_extension(),
|
|
&compat_sigschemes,
|
|
Some(certreq.context.0.clone()),
|
|
);
|
|
|
|
Ok(Box::new(ExpectCertificate {
|
|
config: self.config,
|
|
server_name: self.server_name,
|
|
randoms: self.randoms,
|
|
suite: self.suite,
|
|
transcript: self.transcript,
|
|
key_schedule: self.key_schedule,
|
|
may_send_sct_list: self.may_send_sct_list,
|
|
client_auth: Some(client_auth),
|
|
}))
|
|
}
|
|
}
|
|
|
|
struct ExpectCertificate {
|
|
config: Arc<ClientConfig>,
|
|
server_name: ServerName,
|
|
randoms: ConnectionRandoms,
|
|
suite: &'static Tls13CipherSuite,
|
|
transcript: HandshakeHash,
|
|
key_schedule: KeyScheduleHandshake,
|
|
may_send_sct_list: bool,
|
|
client_auth: Option<ClientAuthDetails>,
|
|
}
|
|
|
|
impl State<ClientConnectionData> for ExpectCertificate {
|
|
fn handle(mut self: Box<Self>, cx: &mut ClientContext<'_>, m: Message) -> hs::NextStateOrError {
|
|
let cert_chain = require_handshake_msg!(
|
|
m,
|
|
HandshakeType::Certificate,
|
|
HandshakePayload::CertificateTLS13
|
|
)?;
|
|
self.transcript.add_message(&m);
|
|
|
|
// This is only non-empty for client auth.
|
|
if !cert_chain.context.0.is_empty() {
|
|
warn!("certificate with non-empty context during handshake");
|
|
cx.common
|
|
.send_fatal_alert(AlertDescription::DecodeError);
|
|
return Err(Error::CorruptMessagePayload(ContentType::Handshake));
|
|
}
|
|
|
|
if cert_chain.any_entry_has_duplicate_extension()
|
|
|| cert_chain.any_entry_has_unknown_extension()
|
|
{
|
|
warn!("certificate chain contains unsolicited/unknown extension");
|
|
cx.common
|
|
.send_fatal_alert(AlertDescription::UnsupportedExtension);
|
|
return Err(PeerMisbehaved::BadCertChainExtensions.into());
|
|
}
|
|
|
|
let server_cert = ServerCertDetails::new(
|
|
cert_chain.convert(),
|
|
cert_chain.get_end_entity_ocsp(),
|
|
cert_chain.get_end_entity_scts(),
|
|
);
|
|
|
|
if let Some(sct_list) = server_cert.scts.as_ref() {
|
|
if hs::sct_list_is_invalid(sct_list) {
|
|
return Err(PeerMisbehaved::InvalidSctList.into());
|
|
}
|
|
|
|
if !self.may_send_sct_list {
|
|
return Err(PeerMisbehaved::UnsolicitedSctList.into());
|
|
}
|
|
}
|
|
|
|
Ok(Box::new(ExpectCertificateVerify {
|
|
config: self.config,
|
|
server_name: self.server_name,
|
|
randoms: self.randoms,
|
|
suite: self.suite,
|
|
transcript: self.transcript,
|
|
key_schedule: self.key_schedule,
|
|
server_cert,
|
|
client_auth: self.client_auth,
|
|
}))
|
|
}
|
|
}
|
|
|
|
// --- TLS1.3 CertificateVerify ---
|
|
struct ExpectCertificateVerify {
|
|
config: Arc<ClientConfig>,
|
|
server_name: ServerName,
|
|
randoms: ConnectionRandoms,
|
|
suite: &'static Tls13CipherSuite,
|
|
transcript: HandshakeHash,
|
|
key_schedule: KeyScheduleHandshake,
|
|
server_cert: ServerCertDetails,
|
|
client_auth: Option<ClientAuthDetails>,
|
|
}
|
|
|
|
impl State<ClientConnectionData> for ExpectCertificateVerify {
|
|
fn handle(mut self: Box<Self>, cx: &mut ClientContext<'_>, m: Message) -> hs::NextStateOrError {
|
|
let cert_verify = require_handshake_msg!(
|
|
m,
|
|
HandshakeType::CertificateVerify,
|
|
HandshakePayload::CertificateVerify
|
|
)?;
|
|
|
|
trace!("Server cert is {:?}", self.server_cert.cert_chain);
|
|
|
|
// 1. Verify the certificate chain.
|
|
let (end_entity, intermediates) = self
|
|
.server_cert
|
|
.cert_chain
|
|
.split_first()
|
|
.ok_or(Error::NoCertificatesPresented)?;
|
|
let now = std::time::SystemTime::now();
|
|
let cert_verified = self
|
|
.config
|
|
.verifier
|
|
.verify_server_cert(
|
|
end_entity,
|
|
intermediates,
|
|
&self.server_name,
|
|
&mut self.server_cert.scts(),
|
|
&self.server_cert.ocsp_response,
|
|
now,
|
|
)
|
|
.map_err(|err| hs::send_cert_error_alert(cx.common, err))?;
|
|
|
|
// 2. Verify their signature on the handshake.
|
|
let handshake_hash = self.transcript.get_current_hash();
|
|
let sig_verified = self
|
|
.config
|
|
.verifier
|
|
.verify_tls13_signature(
|
|
&verify::construct_tls13_server_verify_message(&handshake_hash),
|
|
&self.server_cert.cert_chain[0],
|
|
cert_verify,
|
|
)
|
|
.map_err(|err| hs::send_cert_error_alert(cx.common, err))?;
|
|
|
|
cx.common.peer_certificates = Some(self.server_cert.cert_chain);
|
|
self.transcript.add_message(&m);
|
|
|
|
Ok(Box::new(ExpectFinished {
|
|
config: self.config,
|
|
server_name: self.server_name,
|
|
randoms: self.randoms,
|
|
suite: self.suite,
|
|
transcript: self.transcript,
|
|
key_schedule: self.key_schedule,
|
|
client_auth: self.client_auth,
|
|
cert_verified,
|
|
sig_verified,
|
|
}))
|
|
}
|
|
}
|
|
|
|
fn emit_certificate_tls13(
|
|
transcript: &mut HandshakeHash,
|
|
certkey: Option<&CertifiedKey>,
|
|
auth_context: Option<Vec<u8>>,
|
|
common: &mut CommonState,
|
|
) {
|
|
let context = auth_context.unwrap_or_default();
|
|
|
|
let mut cert_payload = CertificatePayloadTLS13 {
|
|
context: PayloadU8::new(context),
|
|
entries: Vec::new(),
|
|
};
|
|
|
|
if let Some(certkey) = certkey {
|
|
for cert in &certkey.cert {
|
|
cert_payload
|
|
.entries
|
|
.push(CertificateEntry::new(cert.clone()));
|
|
}
|
|
}
|
|
|
|
let m = Message {
|
|
version: ProtocolVersion::TLSv1_3,
|
|
payload: MessagePayload::handshake(HandshakeMessagePayload {
|
|
typ: HandshakeType::Certificate,
|
|
payload: HandshakePayload::CertificateTLS13(cert_payload),
|
|
}),
|
|
};
|
|
transcript.add_message(&m);
|
|
common.send_msg(m, true);
|
|
}
|
|
|
|
fn emit_certverify_tls13(
|
|
transcript: &mut HandshakeHash,
|
|
signer: &dyn Signer,
|
|
common: &mut CommonState,
|
|
) -> Result<(), Error> {
|
|
let message = verify::construct_tls13_client_verify_message(&transcript.get_current_hash());
|
|
|
|
let scheme = signer.scheme();
|
|
let sig = signer.sign(&message)?;
|
|
let dss = DigitallySignedStruct::new(scheme, sig);
|
|
|
|
let m = Message {
|
|
version: ProtocolVersion::TLSv1_3,
|
|
payload: MessagePayload::handshake(HandshakeMessagePayload {
|
|
typ: HandshakeType::CertificateVerify,
|
|
payload: HandshakePayload::CertificateVerify(dss),
|
|
}),
|
|
};
|
|
|
|
transcript.add_message(&m);
|
|
common.send_msg(m, true);
|
|
Ok(())
|
|
}
|
|
|
|
fn emit_finished_tls13(
|
|
transcript: &mut HandshakeHash,
|
|
verify_data: ring::hmac::Tag,
|
|
common: &mut CommonState,
|
|
) {
|
|
let verify_data_payload = Payload::new(verify_data.as_ref());
|
|
|
|
let m = Message {
|
|
version: ProtocolVersion::TLSv1_3,
|
|
payload: MessagePayload::handshake(HandshakeMessagePayload {
|
|
typ: HandshakeType::Finished,
|
|
payload: HandshakePayload::Finished(verify_data_payload),
|
|
}),
|
|
};
|
|
|
|
transcript.add_message(&m);
|
|
common.send_msg(m, true);
|
|
}
|
|
|
|
fn emit_end_of_early_data_tls13(transcript: &mut HandshakeHash, common: &mut CommonState) {
|
|
if common.is_quic() {
|
|
return;
|
|
}
|
|
|
|
let m = Message {
|
|
version: ProtocolVersion::TLSv1_3,
|
|
payload: MessagePayload::handshake(HandshakeMessagePayload {
|
|
typ: HandshakeType::EndOfEarlyData,
|
|
payload: HandshakePayload::EndOfEarlyData,
|
|
}),
|
|
};
|
|
|
|
transcript.add_message(&m);
|
|
common.send_msg(m, true);
|
|
}
|
|
|
|
struct ExpectFinished {
|
|
config: Arc<ClientConfig>,
|
|
server_name: ServerName,
|
|
randoms: ConnectionRandoms,
|
|
suite: &'static Tls13CipherSuite,
|
|
transcript: HandshakeHash,
|
|
key_schedule: KeyScheduleHandshake,
|
|
client_auth: Option<ClientAuthDetails>,
|
|
cert_verified: verify::ServerCertVerified,
|
|
sig_verified: verify::HandshakeSignatureValid,
|
|
}
|
|
|
|
impl State<ClientConnectionData> for ExpectFinished {
|
|
fn handle(self: Box<Self>, cx: &mut ClientContext<'_>, m: Message) -> hs::NextStateOrError {
|
|
let mut st = *self;
|
|
let finished =
|
|
require_handshake_msg!(m, HandshakeType::Finished, HandshakePayload::Finished)?;
|
|
|
|
let handshake_hash = st.transcript.get_current_hash();
|
|
let expect_verify_data = st
|
|
.key_schedule
|
|
.sign_server_finish(&handshake_hash);
|
|
|
|
let fin = constant_time::verify_slices_are_equal(expect_verify_data.as_ref(), &finished.0)
|
|
.map_err(|_| {
|
|
cx.common
|
|
.send_fatal_alert(AlertDescription::DecryptError);
|
|
Error::DecryptError
|
|
})
|
|
.map(|_| verify::FinishedMessageVerified::assertion())?;
|
|
|
|
st.transcript.add_message(&m);
|
|
|
|
let hash_after_handshake = st.transcript.get_current_hash();
|
|
/* The EndOfEarlyData message to server is still encrypted with early data keys,
|
|
* but appears in the transcript after the server Finished. */
|
|
if cx.common.early_traffic {
|
|
emit_end_of_early_data_tls13(&mut st.transcript, cx.common);
|
|
cx.common.early_traffic = false;
|
|
cx.data.early_data.finished();
|
|
st.key_schedule
|
|
.set_handshake_encrypter(cx.common);
|
|
}
|
|
|
|
/* Send our authentication/finished messages. These are still encrypted
|
|
* with our handshake keys. */
|
|
if let Some(client_auth) = st.client_auth {
|
|
match client_auth {
|
|
ClientAuthDetails::Empty {
|
|
auth_context_tls13: auth_context,
|
|
} => {
|
|
emit_certificate_tls13(&mut st.transcript, None, auth_context, cx.common);
|
|
}
|
|
ClientAuthDetails::Verify {
|
|
certkey,
|
|
signer,
|
|
auth_context_tls13: auth_context,
|
|
} => {
|
|
emit_certificate_tls13(
|
|
&mut st.transcript,
|
|
Some(&certkey),
|
|
auth_context,
|
|
cx.common,
|
|
);
|
|
emit_certverify_tls13(&mut st.transcript, signer.as_ref(), cx.common)?;
|
|
}
|
|
}
|
|
}
|
|
|
|
let (key_schedule_pre_finished, verify_data) = st
|
|
.key_schedule
|
|
.into_pre_finished_client_traffic(
|
|
hash_after_handshake,
|
|
st.transcript.get_current_hash(),
|
|
&*st.config.key_log,
|
|
&st.randoms.client,
|
|
);
|
|
|
|
emit_finished_tls13(&mut st.transcript, verify_data, cx.common);
|
|
|
|
/* We're now sure this server supports TLS1.3. But if we run out of TLS1.3 tickets
|
|
* when connecting to it again, we definitely don't want to attempt a TLS1.2 resumption. */
|
|
st.config
|
|
.session_storage
|
|
.remove_tls12_session(&st.server_name);
|
|
|
|
/* Now move to our application traffic keys. */
|
|
cx.common.check_aligned_handshake()?;
|
|
let key_schedule_traffic = key_schedule_pre_finished.into_traffic(cx.common);
|
|
cx.common.start_traffic();
|
|
|
|
let st = ExpectTraffic {
|
|
session_storage: Arc::clone(&st.config.session_storage),
|
|
server_name: st.server_name,
|
|
suite: st.suite,
|
|
transcript: st.transcript,
|
|
key_schedule: key_schedule_traffic,
|
|
_cert_verified: st.cert_verified,
|
|
_sig_verified: st.sig_verified,
|
|
_fin_verified: fin,
|
|
};
|
|
|
|
#[cfg(feature = "quic")]
|
|
if cx.common.is_quic() {
|
|
return Ok(Box::new(ExpectQuicTraffic(st)));
|
|
}
|
|
|
|
Ok(Box::new(st))
|
|
}
|
|
}
|
|
|
|
// -- Traffic transit state (TLS1.3) --
|
|
// In this state we can be sent tickets, key updates,
|
|
// and application data.
|
|
struct ExpectTraffic {
|
|
session_storage: Arc<dyn ClientSessionStore>,
|
|
server_name: ServerName,
|
|
suite: &'static Tls13CipherSuite,
|
|
transcript: HandshakeHash,
|
|
key_schedule: KeyScheduleTraffic,
|
|
_cert_verified: verify::ServerCertVerified,
|
|
_sig_verified: verify::HandshakeSignatureValid,
|
|
_fin_verified: verify::FinishedMessageVerified,
|
|
}
|
|
|
|
impl ExpectTraffic {
|
|
#[allow(clippy::unnecessary_wraps)] // returns Err for #[cfg(feature = "quic")]
|
|
fn handle_new_ticket_tls13(
|
|
&mut self,
|
|
cx: &mut ClientContext<'_>,
|
|
nst: &NewSessionTicketPayloadTLS13,
|
|
) -> Result<(), Error> {
|
|
if nst.has_duplicate_extension() {
|
|
cx.common
|
|
.send_fatal_alert(AlertDescription::IllegalParameter);
|
|
return Err(PeerMisbehaved::DuplicateNewSessionTicketExtensions.into());
|
|
}
|
|
|
|
let handshake_hash = self.transcript.get_current_hash();
|
|
let secret = self
|
|
.key_schedule
|
|
.resumption_master_secret_and_derive_ticket_psk(&handshake_hash, &nst.nonce.0);
|
|
|
|
let time_now = match TimeBase::now() {
|
|
Ok(t) => t,
|
|
#[allow(unused_variables)]
|
|
Err(e) => {
|
|
debug!("Session not saved: {}", e);
|
|
return Ok(());
|
|
}
|
|
};
|
|
|
|
#[allow(unused_mut)]
|
|
let mut value = persist::Tls13ClientSessionValue::new(
|
|
self.suite,
|
|
nst.ticket.0.clone(),
|
|
secret,
|
|
cx.common
|
|
.peer_certificates
|
|
.clone()
|
|
.unwrap_or_default(),
|
|
time_now,
|
|
nst.lifetime,
|
|
nst.age_add,
|
|
nst.get_max_early_data_size()
|
|
.unwrap_or_default(),
|
|
);
|
|
|
|
#[cfg(feature = "quic")]
|
|
if cx.common.is_quic() {
|
|
if let Some(sz) = nst.get_max_early_data_size() {
|
|
if sz != 0 && sz != 0xffff_ffff {
|
|
return Err(PeerMisbehaved::InvalidMaxEarlyDataSize.into());
|
|
}
|
|
}
|
|
|
|
if let Some(ref quic_params) = &cx.common.quic.params {
|
|
value.set_quic_params(quic_params);
|
|
}
|
|
}
|
|
|
|
self.session_storage
|
|
.insert_tls13_ticket(&self.server_name, value);
|
|
Ok(())
|
|
}
|
|
|
|
fn handle_key_update(
|
|
&mut self,
|
|
common: &mut CommonState,
|
|
key_update_request: &KeyUpdateRequest,
|
|
) -> Result<(), Error> {
|
|
#[cfg(feature = "quic")]
|
|
{
|
|
if let Protocol::Quic = common.protocol {
|
|
common.send_fatal_alert(AlertDescription::UnexpectedMessage);
|
|
warn!("KeyUpdate received in QUIC connection");
|
|
return Err(PeerMisbehaved::KeyUpdateReceivedInQuicConnection.into());
|
|
}
|
|
}
|
|
|
|
// Mustn't be interleaved with other handshake messages.
|
|
common.check_aligned_handshake()?;
|
|
|
|
if common.should_update_key(key_update_request)? {
|
|
self.key_schedule
|
|
.update_encrypter_and_notify(common);
|
|
}
|
|
|
|
// Update our read-side keys.
|
|
self.key_schedule
|
|
.update_decrypter(common);
|
|
Ok(())
|
|
}
|
|
}
|
|
|
|
impl State<ClientConnectionData> for ExpectTraffic {
|
|
fn handle(mut self: Box<Self>, cx: &mut ClientContext<'_>, m: Message) -> hs::NextStateOrError {
|
|
match m.payload {
|
|
MessagePayload::ApplicationData(payload) => cx
|
|
.common
|
|
.take_received_plaintext(payload),
|
|
MessagePayload::Handshake {
|
|
parsed:
|
|
HandshakeMessagePayload {
|
|
payload: HandshakePayload::NewSessionTicketTLS13(ref new_ticket),
|
|
..
|
|
},
|
|
..
|
|
} => self.handle_new_ticket_tls13(cx, new_ticket)?,
|
|
MessagePayload::Handshake {
|
|
parsed:
|
|
HandshakeMessagePayload {
|
|
payload: HandshakePayload::KeyUpdate(ref key_update),
|
|
..
|
|
},
|
|
..
|
|
} => self.handle_key_update(cx.common, key_update)?,
|
|
payload => {
|
|
return Err(inappropriate_handshake_message(
|
|
&payload,
|
|
&[ContentType::ApplicationData, ContentType::Handshake],
|
|
&[HandshakeType::NewSessionTicket, HandshakeType::KeyUpdate],
|
|
));
|
|
}
|
|
}
|
|
|
|
Ok(self)
|
|
}
|
|
|
|
fn export_keying_material(
|
|
&self,
|
|
output: &mut [u8],
|
|
label: &[u8],
|
|
context: Option<&[u8]>,
|
|
) -> Result<(), Error> {
|
|
self.key_schedule
|
|
.export_keying_material(output, label, context)
|
|
}
|
|
|
|
#[cfg(feature = "secret_extraction")]
|
|
fn extract_secrets(&self) -> Result<PartiallyExtractedSecrets, Error> {
|
|
self.key_schedule
|
|
.extract_secrets(Side::Client)
|
|
}
|
|
}
|
|
|
|
#[cfg(feature = "quic")]
|
|
struct ExpectQuicTraffic(ExpectTraffic);
|
|
|
|
#[cfg(feature = "quic")]
|
|
impl State<ClientConnectionData> for ExpectQuicTraffic {
|
|
fn handle(mut self: Box<Self>, cx: &mut ClientContext<'_>, m: Message) -> hs::NextStateOrError {
|
|
let nst = require_handshake_msg!(
|
|
m,
|
|
HandshakeType::NewSessionTicket,
|
|
HandshakePayload::NewSessionTicketTLS13
|
|
)?;
|
|
self.0
|
|
.handle_new_ticket_tls13(cx, nst)?;
|
|
Ok(self)
|
|
}
|
|
|
|
fn export_keying_material(
|
|
&self,
|
|
output: &mut [u8],
|
|
label: &[u8],
|
|
context: Option<&[u8]>,
|
|
) -> Result<(), Error> {
|
|
self.0
|
|
.export_keying_material(output, label, context)
|
|
}
|
|
}
|